The man whose name summons up memories of some of the worst violence committed during the conflict in Darfur tells MARY FITZGERALDhow he secured the release of Goal workers Sharon Commins and Hilda Kawuki from a group he describes as 'bandits'
IN DARFUR, they say little happens without Musa Hilal knowing about it. As chief of the region’s largest Arab tribe, Hilal is a man who inspires awe and fear in equal measure. His allies speak of him in reverential tones, testament to the considerable clout he wields both in Darfur and Khartoum. But for others in the troubled corner of western Sudan whose name has become synonymous with one of the most devastating humanitarian crises this century, even the merest mention of Hilal summons up memories of some of the worst violence committed during a conflict that has cost the lives of some 300,000 people.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) says scores of victims and witnesses have named Hilal as the top commander of the Janjaweed, the name many in Darfur use to describe the marauding government-backed militias held responsible for numerous attacks between 2003 and 2004, in which civilians were massacred and raped in front of their families, while their villages were razed.
Last year, HRW described Hilal as “the poster child for Janjaweed atrocities” in Darfur. Five years ago, the US State Department named him as one of six militia leaders alleged to be responsible for serious crimes. In 2006, the UN imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Hilal and three others.
But given his stature as the leader of the Mahameed tribe, and his deep connections with the Khartoum government – last year it appointed him special advisor to Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir – it is likely that Musa Hilal knows more than most about the circumstances surrounding the kidnapping and, more than 100 days later, the release of Goal aid worker Sharon Commins and her Ugandan colleague Hilda Kawuki.
He granted a rare interview to The Irish Times this week in Khartoum. Hilal (48) divides his time between a villa on the outskirts of the Sudanese capital and his home turf in Darfur. He has three wives and more than a dozen children. At his surprisingly lightly-guarded home, one of several domestic staff proffered orange juice and glasses of sweet tea, along with bowls of sugared almonds, dates, cardamom-scented toffee and the contents from a tin of Quality Street. Some time later, Hilal swept into the room and offered his hand in greeting. A tall, imposing figure with an athletic build, he wore a pristine white robe with a white lace skullcap and brown loafers.
Abdul Bagi al-Jailani, Sudan’s minister for humanitarian affairs and the man Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin last week described as the Irish Government’s main point of contact in the case, had earlier told me that President al-Bashir himself had asked Hilal to assist in securing the release of the two women.
Settling down on a plush sofa, Hilal recounted his version of the abduction and release, one that at times contradicted that given by the Sudanese, Irish and Ugandan authorities, most dramatically when he revealed that, contrary to official assertions, the kidnappers were paid a ransom to free the women.
The core group involved in the abduction numbered eight men, Hilal said, five of whom were Arab and three he referred to as “zurga” a derogatory term that can be translated as “blacks”. The word is often used in Sudan to describe those of non-Arab lineage. Asked if any of the kidnappers were from his own Mahameed tribe, Hilal said yes, but added that he does not know them personally. When I mentioned how strange it seems that, given the ethnic tensions that have convulsed Darfur in recent years, the gang was drawn from both Arab and African tribes, he replied: “These people are simply bandits. . . they are gangs that just gather together.”
The way Hilal tells it, the kidnappers had two motives: they wanted money and also to highlight their belief that aid and development efforts by the international community in Darfur were concentrated on African tribes such as the Fur, the people who give the region its name, which means “Land of the Fur”.
“There is no political dimension in what they do but they want some organisations to provide them with certain facilities and services. They feel that the organisations are focusing only on the Fur and others like them,” Hilal said.
Asked why the abduction of the Goal workers, which stretched to three months, two weeks and one day, lasted so long compared with previous cases, Hilal said it was because agreement could not be reached on the ransom. The gang appeared to receive conflicting signals over whether money would be handed over, and they demanded different sums at different stages, with an initial sum of 500 million Sudanese pounds (€150,000) mooted.
More trouble loomed when the Sudanese government relayed the explicit message that they would not allow the payment of a ransom, Hilal recalled. The kidnappers responded by threatening to take the women to neighbouring Chad.
Hilal claimed that he, working through his own mediators, persuaded the gang to drop the Chad plan. “This is the truth. Had I not intervened through these mediators, this situation wouldn’t have been sorted out like this. These guys would not have killed the girls but they would have taken them to Chad or any other place.”
Hilal says he also helped arrange the phone call that took place between Sharon and her mother shortly after Micheál Martin visited Khartoum last month to discuss the abduction with Sudanese officials. At no point did Hilal meet with any of the Irish team working on the case, he said.
In the last stages before the release, the Sudanese ministry for humanitarian affairs finalised everything, Hilal explained. “I just [convinced] the kidnappers back to the £500 million pounds sum and the government paid that amount,” he said.
Jailani had also insisted that criminal charges would be brought against the kidnappers, claiming that the Sudanese authorities know them “by name, clan and family”. But when I asked him if any moves had been made to arrest them, given that the Sudanese apparently know their identities and location, Jailani replied: “This is not the time for that, but we are going to arrest them and bring them to justice sooner or later. Through the mediators we told them that at this moment we will not touch them so just release the ladies, but we didn’t give any immunity or forgiveness.”
Hilal, however, claimed the government has no information about the gang’s current whereabouts, and added that the kidnappers had forced the mediators to swear on the Koran that they would not reveal their identities. For his part, Hilal is in favour of prosecuting those responsible. “If their identities become known and the government is serious about it, I would support their being brought to justice,” he said.
The circumstances surrounding the Goal kidnapping raise several questions about what has transpired in Darfur in recent years.
The region erupted into violence in 2003, when rebels complaining of marginalisation and discrimination in favour of Arab tribes took up arms against the Khartoum government. In the ensuing fighting, during which the Sudanese army bombed from the air and allied militias laid waste to what was left of the villages below, a new word – Janjaweed – burned itself into the consciousness of the world.
The term Janjaweed itself had long been used to refer to bandits from the area where Sudan’s western border melts into Chad. The bandits roamed the vast plains of Darfur, robbing Arabs and non-Arabs, nomads and farmers. But the militias that became known as Janjaweed after the rebels first struck six years ago were used by Khartoum as something akin to a counterinsurgency proxy force in place of, and sometimes alongside, its regular army. Similar militias had been deployed in the two decades long civil war in southern Sudan. Members of the militia in Darfur were paid a salary, and their notoriety grew not only because of their violence and brutality, but also because they were given free rein to loot and seize livestock and land from the non-Arab tribes whose men bolstered the rebels’ ranks.
In August, the outgoing commander of the joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur said the six-year war between rebels and government forces had effectively ended but the region remained unstable with banditry proving a particular problem. Analysts say the continuing instability is very much linked to the question of what happened to all those fighters who answered Khartoum’s call to arms only to now find themselves without jobs or money.
“The Janjaweed were paid by the government before, but now there is no payment so they are doing things like kidnapping for money,” a member of one of the constellation of rebel groups still operating in Darfur told me. “The government doesn’t have the same control over the Janjaweed that they once had. This creates a very dangerous situation.”
When I put this to Musa Hilal, he first complained that the word Janjaweed has been misused. “There is no organised entity called the Janjaweed. . . It is a local word that we use to refer to any person practising highway robbery or burgling houses.
“No one can claim he has control over unorganised criminals.”
But are those who once joined the militias disgruntled and desperate because their government stipends have dried up?
“Maybe,” he answers.
Jailani, whose predecessor as humanitarian affairs minister, along with President al-Bashir, has been charged by the International Criminal Court in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Darfur, insisted that banditry is an inevitable consequence of the conflict. “These people are idle and illiterate and they have guns in their hands so what do you expect from them? We have to keep them busy by initiating projects for them so they can lead a quiet life and we can get rid of banditry in the area,” he said.
Asked if any of the Goal kidnappers had been involved in the fighting that has wracked the region since 2003, Jailani paused. “That is a very interesting political question,” he replied. “I cannot say yes or no. I’m not sure.”
Musa Hilal batted away questions regarding his role in Darfur with a well-practised ease. It is not true, he insists, that he gave orders for innocent people to be killed and villages to be destroyed. He dismissed accusations that ethnic cleansing was part of Khartoum’s strategy in Darfur, insisting that Darfuris of all ethnicities have lived together and intermarried for some time.
Is he a war criminal as so many have charged? “No, this is not true,” he replied. Does he fear being prosecuted in the future? “No, why should I be afraid? What evidence do they have?”
He argued that the tensions that have torn Darfur apart have been caused by external forces. “The problem is we Darfuris of different backgrounds have become pawns in the hands of others. . . We have become something like a commodity.
“The people of Darfur can accomplish peace themselves. If you get all the movements and the leaders, put them together for two weeks, they would reach peace. If the outsiders wash their hands of this issue we will be able to find a solution together.”