ANALYSIS:Rather than dwelling on Kenny as figurehead, the strategists played cards of policy and image, writes HARRY McGEE, Political Correspondent
FINE GAEL’S election was an audacious success. It followed the famous strategy of American civil war general Nathan Bedford Forrest: “Get there firstest with the mostest.”
On just about every metric that decides the outcome of an election, Fine Gael emerged as the party with the firstest and the mostest: easy to understand policies, consistency of message, massively resourced campaign and slick organisation.
Indeed, its biggest potential problem was Enda Kenny. He had not inspired confidence with voters as a potential taoiseach – historically, he was a poor performer in public. He was poor in his command of detail and lacking spontaneity.
For many months, Fine Gael worked on a campaign to spread the leadership. It began presenting Kenny as a chairman rather than a chief and began to push the notion of a “leadership team”. When canvassers encountered the line on doorsteps (as they often did) that “I like you but not your leader”, they countered by noting other leader figures such as Michael Noonan, Richard Bruton and Leo Varadkar.
In one sense, the circumstances of Kenny’s poor image forced Fine Gael into concentrating on its party image and its policy rather than the more conventional “presidential” campaign centred on a party leader.
And that shift chimed with the prevailing mood. The leader issue was less important in this election, as evidenced by the limited impact of Labour’s “Gilmore for Taoiseach” and the unerring focus of Fianna Fáil on Micheál Martin.
While minimising “live” opportunities, Fine Gael strategists instead presented Kenny as a potential national leader by organising (wholly unnecessary) meetings with the likes of Angela Merkel and José Manuel Barroso. And Kenny was encouraged to cultivate an air of seriousness and quiet authority and confidence. The party took a gamble by refusing to allow him take part in the first debate on TV3. But all the downplaying and media shyness resulted in voters having low expectations for the five-way debate on RTÉ. As it transpired, the format suited him and he made no blunders. In one of the great paradoxes of the campaign, his stock rose dramatically and his status changed from liability to asset.
"He's a championship footballer. He does not always bring it out in league matches. But in this campaign he upped his game," a key strategist reflected afterwards. Fine Gael (Kenny in particular) stuck to its five-point-plan like Gollum clung to "Precious" in The Lord of the Rings. The plan, decided many months before, was to be adhered to no matter what. It was unwavering; unlike Labour and Fianna Fáil, there was no chopping or changing of policy or position. Consistency was key.
Nor should the financial aspect be underestimated. The US experience has shown a direct nexus between campaign financing and electoral success. The war-chest Fine Gael had at its disposal was awesome. Its multimillion-euro campaign did not confine itself to posters, literature, billboards and televison. The party also swamped the web, Twitter and social networks – it had 39 young party members working shifts on a huge bank of computers at its election headquarters. In comparison, Labour was relatively well-funded but Fianna Fáil was broke.
Fine Gael’s election campaign was the culmination of a decade-long plan drafted by Frank Flannery soon after Kenny became leader in 2002. There were important milestones.
The party changed the rules on local election candidates. In 2004 and 2009 elections, the success of candidates such as Varadkar; Lucinda Creighton; Eoghan Murphy and Dara Murphy helped give it a young, vibrant profile. While the 2007 election was a disappointment, research by the party showed its simple “Contract for a Better Ireland” and its colour-coded posters worked well for the party. Out of that emerged the five-point plan with its dayglo colour scheme.
But there were stumbles along the way. The party had a terrible first half of 2010. Its star signing, George Lee, peremptorily resigned and, after a series of mediocre performances, Enda Kenny faced a leadership challenge. He showed a streak of ruthlessness in firing frontbench dissenters. Encouraged by key ally Phil Hogan, he showed a hitherto hidden steeliness.
That showdown was Fine Gael’s epiphany. It never looked back. Kenny invited most of the dissidents back to the front bench and it was more focused, sharper and stronger. A huge factor was the return of Michael Noonan. In some ways, the politician who lost the election in 2002 won it for them in 2011. His perfectly calibrated and savvy public utterances caught the zeitgeist – particularly his appeal to Brian Cowen to stop talking in riddles about impending International Monetary Fund intervention.
Last summer, Fine Gael’s research teams began working on policy papers, distilled into the five-point plan. They were signed off at the party’s think-in in Waterford in September. At the same time, Labour, riding high in the polls, decided it would run on Gilmore’s personality. Both were fateful decisions.
“We had a message every day,” said a strategist. “Labour just didn’t do that. They went solely on Gilmore. Several days during the campaign, they had nothing to say. They were just filling in at their conferences.”
Its campaign strategy was geared towards a maximum of 70 – key campaign managers say an overall majority was never really feasible. Dublin South and Meath East were good examples of a balanced vote share. The more risky proposition of getting three elected in Wexford and Cork South-Central backfired on two sitting TDs who lost out to Seanad colleagues. The path to government was also facilitated by the historic circumstances preceding the election – the implosion of the economy and the ceding of sovereignty.
“The Fianna Fáil collapse made it easier for us, but also allowed Labour do well, which picked up its social democratic votes. Sinn Féin also made a large claim for its republican element.” Fine Gael was not shy in hawking itself to Fianna Fáil supporters.
Hogan came up with the ruse of asking Fianna Fáil voters to “loan” their votes to Fine Gael. The party was not above some old-fashioned smearing; its pointed swipes at Labour for being a high-tax party and the attack on Martin for not forgoing his ministerial severance.
Conversely, when Kenny got attacked for holding on to his equally questionable teacher’s pension, it had almost no impact. It was too late.
He was already there – the firstest with the mostest.
Fine Gael: New TDs
Projected seats:76 (2007: 51)
Share of first preference vote:36.1% (2007: 27.3)
NEW TDs
Tom Barry (Cork East)
Ray Butler (Meath West)
Jerry Buttimer (Cork South Central)
Paudie Coffey (Waterford)
Áine Collins (Cork North West)
Sean Conlan (Cavan Monaghan)
Jim Daly (Cork South West)
Pat Deering (Carlow Kilkenny)
Regina Doherty (Meath East)
Paschal Donohoe (Dublin Central)
Alan Farrell (Dublin North)
Frances Fitzgerald (Dublin Mid West)
Peter Fitzpatrick (Louth)
Brendan Griffin (Kerry South)
Noel Harrington (Cork SW)
Martin Heydon (Kildare South)
Heather Humphreys (Cavan Monaghan)
Derek Keating (Dublin Mid West)
Anthony Lawlor (Kildare North)
Peter Mathews (Dublin South)
Nicky McFadden (Longford Westmeath)
Tony McLoughlin (Sligo North Leitrim)
Michelle Mulherin (Mayo)
Dara Murphy (Cork North Central)
Eoghan Murphy (Dublin South East)
Patrick O’Donovan (Limerick)
Mary Mitchell O’Connor (Dún Laoghaire)
Joe O’Reilly (Cavan Monaghan)
John Paul Phelan (Carlow Kilkenny)
Liam Twomey (Wexford)
ONES WHO LOST THEIR SEATS
Deirdre Clune (Cork South Central)
Michael D’Arcy (Wexford)
Tom Sheahan (Kerry South)