The following is the full text of the document issued yesterday by the Irish and British governments explaining their reasons for ejecting Sinn Fein from the talks.
1. This document sets out the conclusions of the governments on the position of Sinn Fein in the talks.
Background: The Rules and Principles
Rules of procedure
2. Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure for the negotiations agreed says: "If, during the negotiations, a formal representation is made to the independent chairmen that a participant is no longer entitled to participate on the grounds that they have demonstrably dishonoured the principles of democracy and non-violence as set forth in the report of 22 January 1996 of the international body, this will be circulated by the chairmen to all participants and will be subject to appropriate action by the governments, having due regard to the views of the participants.
The Mitchell Principles
3. The relevant passage of the international body's report reads:
Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:
To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;
To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in allparty negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
The murders of Mr Campbell and Mr Dougan
4. Following the murders last week of Mr Brendan Campbell and Mr Robert Dougan, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that she had been fully briefed by the Chief Constable of the RUC, and his assessment was that the IRA were involved in both these murders. She considered that the issue would need to be examined with the Irish Government and the other talks participants in accordance with the proper procedures.
The British Government's representation
5. Shortly after the start of proceedings in Strand Two of the talks on February 16th, the Chairman (Senator Mitchell) indicated that the governments had advised him that an issue had been raised under rule 29.
The Secretary of State spoke, at his invitation: her speaking note is attached at A. The note was circulated to other participants, and the chairman later ruled (in response to objections from Sinn Fein) that it constituted a formal representation under rule 29. The Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke in the terms at Annex B.
The Alliance Party representation
6. The Alliance Party made to the Chairmen on February 17th a representation under rule 29, based on the same facts as the British government had raised, that "Sinn Fein is no longer entitled to participate in these talks on the grounds that they have demonstrably dishonoured the principles of democracy and non-violence". It was circulated and considered at the same time as the British government representation.
Procedures followed
7. The independent chairmen, having consulted Sinn Fein and other participants over the timing and other details of proceedings, concluded that to permit Sinn Fein further time to prepare its response, a plenary session of the talks should be postponed until 2 p.m. on February 17th. Senator Mitchell's statement covering the point is at C.
8. When the plenary session met, a total of three adjournments (totalling more than four hours) were granted at the request of Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein announced its intention to take legal action over the British government representation, and sought a further adjournment pending its outcome: Senator Mitchell concluded that such an adjournment would be unjustifiable.
9. At the start of substantive business, the two governments were first invited to make statements; then the Alliance Party spoke to its representation. Sinn Fein then responded orally, and later circulated a written response (D).
Other participants were then permitted to contribute, in accordance with Rule 29; Finally Sinn Fein was permitted to reply. The governments have since considered the question of appropriate action, in the light of all the material available to them, including previous determinations in regard to Rule 29, and having due regard to the Sinn Fein response and the views of participants.
Plenary Discussion
10. In their submission, Sinn Fein ndrew attention to the statement issued by the IRA on February 12th 1998, to the effect that "contrary to speculation surrounding recent killings in Belfast, the IRA cessation of military operations remains intact". The president of Sinn Fein went on to state:
"The IRA have not, in my firmest belief, breached their cessation. Sinn Fein completely disavows all killings. We have worked for, called for and are opposed to all killings."
Sinn Fein recalled that they had worked to establish ceasefires on all sides and indicated that they would continue to work for, and use their influence for, the maintenance of ceasefires of all armed groups.
11. Sinn Fein were strongly of the view that they had not demonstrably dishonoured their commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence set out in the report of the international body.
12. Other points made by Sinn Fein in the plenary discussion and in its written response may be summarised as follows:
The representation of the British government was defective as a foundation for the process, and inadequate as a statement of the case Sinn Fein had to respond to; the British government was in an unsatisfactory position, having initiated the process and then taking part in the final determination;
it had brought the question forward out of political expediency, under pressure from the UUP; it also reflected the influence of the RUC, which was not objective;
the rule 29 process had only once previously resulted in a party being excluded (the case of the UDP - and even then the case had been brought in slower time to the present one); many other killings, and instances of violence and threats, had taken place without the process being invoked;
Sinn Fein had no involvement in the killings, indeed that was not suggested. The IRA must answer for itself, though it was to be noted that those charged in connection with Mr Dougan's killing had not been charged with IRA membership. Sinn Fein was not in an analogous position to the UDP, which made clear it represented the UDA/UFF;
the present process was in large measure due to its efforts; its members had taken substantial risks for peace, and often calmed potential violence; putting Sinn Fein out of the talks would deny representation to those who voted for it, and damage nationalist confidence in the process.
13. In discussion the following further points were made by one or more delegations:
abhorrence of the two killings was expressed;
it was no contribution to the talks to put Sinn Fein out, any more than the UDP; its political analysis was valuable to the process;
Sinn Fein's delegates had shown a commitment to peaceful means, and a capacity for political leadership; other parties had not shown such leadership and were hostile to Sinn Fein;
Sinn Fein should not be excluded from the talks, on the basis that the party had not itself demonstrably dishonoured the Mitchell Principles, had expressed its disavowal of all killings and had in the past worked to bring about ceasefires all round;
there was particular value in a fully inclusive process; no party should be excluded;
there was room for concern as to how far natural justice was being observed; the absence of a denial should not itself found an inculpation; there were ambiguities in terminology: what were, for example, the "republican movement" or "demonstrably dishonouring"?
the presentation of evidence by the British government had been insufficiently complete to permit a firm view of who had committed the killings; as a result, parties had been put in an impossible position in the matter;
it was not a question of any of the parties assessing the intelligence or the evidence: the rules dictated that it was only the two governments who could make the decision to expel or not to expel;
in coming to a determination, the two governments should be consistent in applying the same criteria and following the same procedures as in previous determinations (these were detailed), having regard also to the minutes of the discussions in those cases, whether these determinations resulted in exclusion or not;
in terms of the role of parties in the determination process, it was not a question of seeking to condemn or support the indicted party; what was needed was a careful process that met the requirements of fairness and consistency; in that regard, the help of Sinn Fein in terms of the use of particular language of disavowal or dissociation as had been used in past cases would be valuable in enabling the other parties and the governments to come to a view;
the Chief Constable's assessment merely confirmed what was widely understood in Northern Ireland;
excluding Sinn Fein was consistent with the UDP case; that party could have been excluded even without the UFF statement of January 23rd;
Sinn Fein was inextricably linked to the IRA; it had not condemned the killings or the individuals responsible;
the killings cast doubt on Sinn Fein's commitment to exclusively peaceful means;
the IRA had committed both murders, and in view of the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein, this constituted a clear breach of the Mitchell Principles by the latter, analogous to that which had led to the exclusion from the talks of the UDP;
Sinn Fein should explicitly condemn the murders and those who had committed them;
if the IRA cessation were demonstrated over a period to remain genuine in word and deed, Sinn Fein should, if excluded, be readmitted.