How do you put pressure on the IRA? It is a question which has been exercising some of the finest minds in official and political circles in Dublin and London, not to mention the White House and the political parties in the North.
One is reminded of the classic scene in all those black-and-white prison movies where a priest, usually played by Spencer Tracy, would plead with a rebellious inmate of the penitentiary, played by James Cagney, to think of his mother and his religious obligations and the futility of further violence, and please, please, hand over the gun.
In the films it always seemed to work, but the peace process is not a movie. Nevertheless, those who are entrusted with the task of disarming the IRA might learn a lesson or two from the Spencer Tracy school of decommissioning.
Tracy never bothered telling Cagney that, if he didn't hand over the gun, there would be very bad publicity in the media. As a former Taoiseach once said to me in this regard: "The IRA doesn't care about bad publicity."
Therefore one assumes that, as a practical and sensible individual, Gen de Chastelain has, in his contacts with the IRA interlocutor, refrained from making any reference to the episodes at Carrickmore and Pomeroy and how a failure to move on weapons will lead to further "bad ink" for the republican movement.
But the Canadian military man has doubtless been seeking some form of movement so that he can present a positive report to the Northern Secretary, Mr Peter Mandelson, and the Republic's Minister for Justice, Mr O'Donoghue, today.
It was generally believed that contacts with the IRA interlocutor would continue over the weekend and might even last until today. After all, the deadline for delivery of the report does not expire until midnight tonight.
In his last report, issued on December 10th, the general hinted at the possibility of setting his own timetable for gradual disarmament, leading to the May deadline. That prospect seems to have gone by the board this time, presumably on the basis that the republican mood is sour enough right now without making matters worse.
Persuasion in the Spencer Tracy mould, not dire warnings, is more likely to yield results.
The situation is a mess. An agreement was reached in the Mitchell review but only in the context of a May deadline for total disarmament. High-level unionist sources close to the negotiations have conceded there was no undertaking from the republicans to begin decommissioning by the end of January but that the unionists felt such a gesture would have been consistent with the spirit of the unionist-republican rapprochement.
Republicans deny there was any basis for such a conclusion.
Some observers who were placing their bets on an IRA gesture by today at the latest are now insisting that it would have happened if Mr Trimble had not upset the apple cart by proposing that the UUC reconvene in February.
Republican representatives made it clear that they were angry over Mr Trimble's demarche and were unsympathetic to the notion that he had to do it to survive. However, it is more likely that there was never going to be decommissioning this month: a more plausible version of events has it that Mr Trimble's actions jeopardised the unprecedented arrangement for an IRA interlocutor to meet the decommissioning body.
We now know from Mr Gerry Adams's comments over the weekend that, if the institutions are suspended, the IRA interlocutor will probably be withdrawn.
Political insiders have stressed the significance of that move by the IRA in the first place: having played no part in the political process up to now, apart from calling the ceasefires, the IRA was being obliged to confront the disarmament issue in face-to-face talks with the body specifically appointed to oversee total decommissioning.
The widespread expectation is that the general will try to be as positive as he can within the terms of his remit. There is no evidence to suggest that he will be able to report the handover or destruction of weapons.
The hope of political insiders was that he would be in a position to state that the modalities (methods and procedures) of decommissioning had been agreed with the IRA.
While the DUP and others would doubtless point out that the UVF agreed modalities in 1998 but had still not decommissioned, the two governments could potentially argue a case that agreement of modalities represented progress.
The political barometer indicates, however, that even securing modalities would be a major political achievement in the current climate, and some observers believe it is simply not on the cards.
Sources close to republican thinking say that the tabling of a motion on the general's report by Mr Trimble for debate in the Assembly tomorrow afternoon was taken as a clear signal that even verbal gestures were pointless: the unionists were donning their overcoats and heading for the exits already.
Nobody, except perhaps some unionists, is rushing to press the pause button on Stormont and the North-South Ministerial Council. For one thing, it will require legislation to be rushed through Westminster and probably the Oireachtas, because there is nothing on the statute book at present. A new clause might have to be inserted into the British-Irish Agreement.
It would be so much neater if the general were able to reassure the governments that decommissioning was on track. There would then be the unenviable and perhaps impossible task of trying to sell this to unionists.
The need to jolly along the unionists may have to be balanced against the prospect of adverse nationalist reaction to suspension. The decision on suspension will no doubt be made on foot of a threat by Mr Trimble to walk out of the Executive, but republican spokesmen will make hay with the fact that the only explicit decommissioning deadline is May, not January 31st or February 12th.
The consensus view at official level yesterday still seemed to be that the resignation of Mr Trimble must be avoided at all costs but that suspension would be "a bad blow all round". Preventing or at least staving off both these eventualities in the wake of the general's report will be a major political test.