The majority of Salafis are peaceful, but the extremists want to liberate the Muslim community worldwide
THE APPEARANCE of politically assertive, hardline fundamentalists in Egypt after the uprising has awakened the country’s democrats to the dangers posed by these radicals, disciples of Saudi Wahabi- inspired activists.
Last Saturday, clashes erupted between radicals and Coptic Christians in the Cairo slum district of Imbaba, when rumours spread that a Coptic woman who had married a Muslim and converted to Islam was being held in a church there. The authorities are under pressure to clamp down on the group held responsible, the Coalition to Support New Muslims, which attracted a membership of 800 following the toppling of president Hosni Mubarak.
Radicals have also fought with mystic Muslim Sufis, prompting democracy advocates to demand a crackdown by the security forces. The more moderate Muslim Brotherhood has condemned the radicals’ attitudes and actions as un-Islamic.
Some radical preachers argue that since 80 per cent of Egyptians are Muslims, they must be “returned” to the correct path though da’wa, an enlightenment campaign, and the country must be governed by Muslim canon law.
The radicals have unfairly been termed “Salafis”. But not all Salafis are radicals. Salafis are Sunni Muslims who seek to follow the example of the Salaf, the pious predecessors who belonged to the first three generations of the faithful, particularly the companions of the prophet Muhammad and their progeny.
The father of Salafism was the ninth-century scholar Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who founded the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, one of the four recognised as orthodox.
His literal approach to Islam, strict interpretation of law and rejection of unverifiable information on the life of the prophet was taken up by the 14th-century scholar Taqi ed-Din Ibn Taymiyyah and the 18th-century Saudi cleric Muhammad Ibn Abdel-Wahhab. The latter became the intellectual force behind the puritanical Wahabi movement.
Three late 19th- and early 20th-century scholars at al-Azhar University in Cairo, the supreme seat of Islamic scholarship, also made a serious contribution to the Muslim revival.
These figures pressed for religious, educational and legal reform to meet the challenges Muslims faced from European imperialism and the ideas of the Enlightenment.
But instead of adopting a forward-thinking response, the Salafi response has been to look backward and to cling to “eternal” doctrine and traditions.
Salafis stress monotheism and eschew anything that appears to be idolatry, reject innovation and dismiss philosophical debate. They contend that Muslims should adhere to the Koran and the Hadith and abide by the consensus of the community. Austere puritans, they reject music, insist on conservative dress and sequester women. But they also use the internet as their main means of enlightenment and recruitment.
There are three groups of Salafis. The vast majority are peaceful, apolitical puritans who follow clerics requiring devotion and urging detachment from local and international affairs. They condemn the waging of holy war (jihad) by means of terrorism. This group is tolerated by Muslim rulers.
But a growing minority of activists has coalesced around preachers who have converted lapsed Muslims and those who do not identify with Salafism to their beliefs. They have formed groups that are mounting challenges to mainstream fundamentalists, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Hamas movement in Gaza.
The third group is a tiny minority of “Jihadi Salafis” who have captured headlines round the world and given the quietist majority of Salafis a bad name.
Jihadi Salafis are determined to liberate the worldwide Muslim community from foreign control and influence. Many also seek to retaliate against those they consider “enemies of Islam” for colonising Muslim lands, intervening in Muslim affairs and humiliating Muslims.
Some have joined the ranks of al-Qaeda, the main transnational purveyor of radical Salafism. Al-Qaeda adherents pour into areas where there is a political vacuum. Iraq attracted thousands of radicals after the 2003 US occupation. Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Caucasus are current al-Qaeda hosts. In the Levant, the local Hizb al-Tahrir, Jund al-Islam, Fatah al-Islam, and Jaysh al-Islam have risen in Palestinian refugee camps and moved into surrounding communities.
In Egypt, veteran Jihadi Salafis have shifted to domestic political activity. In Algeria, they have joined the apolitical majority.
While apolitical Salafism is not affected by adherents’ circumstances, the political and socio-economic factors contributing to the rise of political and Jihadi Salafism among the young across the Muslim world are unresponsive rulers and frustration due to poverty, poor education, unemployment and hopelessness.
