The most senior frontline British army officer on Bloody Sunday today denied that the paras were sent in to "scare the living daylights out of the hooligans".
Under questioning at the Saville inquiry in London, General Sir Robert Ford (78) the Commander of the Land Forces, said the 1st Parachute Regiment were simply the right men for a "quick in-and-out arrest operation" to stop an illegal march where violence was expected.
Christopher Clarke QC, counsel for the inquiry, asked Gen Ford: "Is the essential reason why 1 Para were sent in, that they were tough and would, putting it bluntly, scare the living daylights out of the hooligans?"
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Sir Robert said 1 Para, who had a proud and fierce reputation for no-nonsense tough action, were ideal because they "had plenty of experience of rounding up hooligans".
"They had done a great deal of it," he said. "I had seen one or two instances where they had done it very well indeed".
They expected to face IRA snipers and the Bogside's stone-throwing youths who were terrorising the commercial district, Gen Ford said.
The Belfast-based 1 Para did not know the Bogside and had never operated in the area before.
On Bloody Sunday, January 30th, 1972, British paratroopers killed 13 unarmed civilians on a Derry march.
Colonel Roy Jackson, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Anglians, one of Derry's resident battalions, was "surprised" that 1 Para was selected for a scoop-up operation that was to be conducted on foot, the inquiry was told.
Everyone was aware of their reputation for tough action, and Bogsiders, both innocent civilians and hooligans, would be "greatly surprised if Belfast arrest procedures were carried out on them", Colonel Jackson said in a statement read out to the inquiry.
He added: "I just wondered who had thought out this deployment. It reflected a change of policy and emphasis on future operations in Londonderry."
The paras had a fierce reputation which they had cultivated in Belfast as a no-nonsense outfit - known as "the para effect".
General Ford admitted that "with hindsight" the para effect did not work in Derry.
This was something he did not foresee as a possibility at the time, contending that the paras could easily overcome their unfamiliarity with the local geography through reconnaissance missions.
According to a document read out to the inquiry: "1 Para did not kill anyone in Belfast except the odd terrorist.
"They had only to be there and everyone went to the ground. They were terrified. But they did not do that in Londonderry. They all stood it up as it were. 1 Para had a very difficult job so the operation was not a success.
"It was a local success in that the amount of hooligan damage in the next month was almost nil. But that was really a very small reward for all the tremendous impact it had on the army and everything else."
General Ford accepted that in crowd situations such as the Bloody Sunday march that there would be a risk of innocent people hanging around.
This was something which had to be "allowed for" he said, adding: "Anyone who is sensible keeps well away from it and it would only be the stupid who would go and be in the area of a violent crowd, which it was, knowing that some form of reaction was inevitable."
Gen Ford, who was responsible for the army's day-to-day operations in Northern Ireland, decided to bring the Belfast-based paras to Derry, and they should lead the arrest operation.
All tactical decisions that day were made by Brigadier Patrick MacLellan, Commander of 8th Brigade, who was in charge of all the paras in Derry, he said.
PA