The announcement of a new judicial inquiry into Bloody Sunday has evoked familiar unionist reactions. The "What about Bloody Friday?" syndrome is typical, and one can see how quickly the particular knee is jerked.
The difficulties are numerous but all cluster around the familiar division of in-group and out-group mentalities. For unionism the out-group has inflicted more pain on its people, and a new inquiry in perceived as "another concession" to the worst of the aggressor out-group, the republicans.
But the whole essence of the difficulty revolves around this. The "state" to which they are loyal had the British army, which had often been regarded as "our army", under the spotlight for what unionism will perceive as performing duties against those who threaten the "state". The real possibility that their in-group cannot maintain its positive distinction from the out-group goes to the very heart of the unionist matter.
I researched Bloody Sunday from a particular perspective, involving interviews with clergy of both the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian (as very representative of the Protestant family) churches. Many of the attitudes of the Presbyterian clergy are indicative of the difficulties Bloody Sunday presents unionism. Ethnic/political bias demands that the positive distinction from the out-group is maintained. One has to maximise the wrongdoing of the "others" and minimise that of "your own".
In Bloody Sunday this was achieved by, for example, stressing the illegality of the march as the cause of causes: "If they hadn't have marched, this would not have happened" was a typical remark. Another was that the march was part of a challenge against "orderly government" or the "law of the land". Having maximised the wrongdoing, the next step was to minimise that of the in-group.
This was achieved by the following methods. The numerous and profound issues such as the orders for the Bloody Sunday operation, the methods used, the proportionality of response are evaded by vague generalities such as "There's no smoke without fire" or "It doesn't matter if there's one shot of 100" when referring to IRA activity on the day. But most indicative, and for me the most tragic of all, is the internalisation of who and what one believes.
Army commanders and press officers, unionist and British government ministers all produced statements in the aftermath. And, of course, Widgery then produced his report.
In my research I found next to no questioning of their versions: these were officials of their in-group, their side of the story was correct. For example, a typical view was that "colonels do not make statements lightly" or, in the case of Widgery, "the silence was more informative than any of the content of reaction".
As one minister intimated, his flock would not have generally been concerned! But the real rub of ethnic/political bias and the depth of the problem to the unionist psyche is highlighted by Protestant reactions to priestly versions of the events.
Edward Daly and many other priests were, of course, eyewitnesses. These "fellow Christians" testified on the day and at the Widgery tribunal to many of the killings. But rather than accept these versions, Protestant ministers most definitely sided with the state versions.
Typical of the handling of this tension were the words of one minister who explained this attitude as "not disbelieving priests, rather inclining his belief to the army". This method of "rationalising" displays the profound problem facing many unionists: could it be that the out-group is correct and the in-group will have to officially acknowledge this eventually ?
Much of the unionist and British raison d'etre rests on its claim to legitimacy: the terrorist emanates from the out-group, it is "them" who commit violence, whereas the state uses "necessary force". To admit otherwise truly goes to the very foundation of "their state" and security forces' and unionism's benign view of both.
This is typified by one minister who simply could not understand British soldiers firing at unarmed civilians (and here is the psychological Rubicon) even though he knew "it had happened in the past".
If the internalisation of profound question marks against the in-group is incredibly difficult even for the Protestant minister, it helps explain the "what-aboutery" reactions of unionist politicians and points to ambivalences about the whole question of violence.
Brian Faulkner wrote in his memoirs that he did not want to rake over the ashes of Bloody Sunday: it might have been too difficult for him to give even a part of the inside story. However, the ashes are being reignited and will continue to pose problems for the unionist psyche.
Billy Leonard conducted DPhil research with the University of Ulster on how the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian churches addressed the violence of the Troubles. Bloody Sunday was one of the major examples