SPAIN: Is the Basque Country on the verge of peace talks? Paddy Woodworth talks to the leader of Batasuna, the party closest to ETA, and potentially the Basque Gerry Adams
"When ETA was on ceasefire in 1998/99, people called me the Basque Gerry Adams," says Arnaldo Otegi wryly. "When the truce ended I was called a savage Taliban, in thrall to a military organisation I could not control. I suppose if there is another truce I will be the Basque Gerry Adams once again."
Superficially, Otegi has changed little since that truce opened a brief window of hope in the Basque conflict. Now 47, he remains youthful-looking, retaining an ear stud, a boyish haircut and a trademark smart black T-shirt.
He still smiles a lot and responds to critical comments more patiently than many less radical Basque politicians.
But a great deal has changed in the Basque Country, and in the world, since ETA renewed its terrorist campaign in 1999. Otegi's party, Batasuna, has been banned from participation in elections, alleged by the Spanish courts to be an integral part of the terrorist organisation.
The group continues to function in public, though the ownership of the office where I met Otegi in San Sebastián last week is currently under judicial investigation. Otegi himself faces charges related to ETA membership, which he denies, though he acknowledges his role in that organisation in the past.
Meanwhile, the eruption of Islamist terrorism internationally has seriously dampened enthusiasm for "armed struggle" among Batasuna supporters, though the full impact of this factor remains unclear.
So Otegi is much more cautious in his political assessments now than he was in the heady early days of ETA's longest ceasefire. "There is no peace process here yet," he says. "There is only a process of conversations about future conversations".
Nevertheless, he believes that a series of unprecedented statements by Spain's prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, including a conditional offer of "dialogue" with ETA, is very significant. "We may be closer to a resolution of the Basque conflict than we have ever been before," Otegi says.
The high hopes raised by the 1998/99 ceasefire foundered on the intransigence of both ETA and the conservative government of José María Aznar.
ETA's return to violence was particularly ugly. Academics and journalists joined local politicians on its long list of "legitimate" targets; 23 people died in Basque terrorist attacks in 2000 alone.
The September 11th attacks on the US the following year were seized by Aznar as an opportunity to crank up pressure against ETA and Batasuna nationally and internationally. The party was banned in July 2002. Meanwhile, a long series of significant arrests and arms seizures has greatly undermined ETA's infrastructure.
However, the whole Spanish scenario changed again with the dramatic defeat of Aznar's Partido Popular (PP) in the aftermath of the Islamist train bombs massacre in Madrid in March 2004.
The PP's efforts to blame ETA for these attacks disgusted a majority of the Spanish public, who saw this as a blatant attempt to play politics with terrorism. These voters turned to the Socialist Party (PSOE), under the untried leadership of Zapatero.
Last May, Zapatero offered to talk to ETA, on the strict condition that the group permanently abandons terrorism. He has also accepted Catalonia's case for recognition as a "nation".
Both moves are heresy to large sectors of the Spanish establishment, including some senior members of his own party.
Otegi says he is still not sure whether Zapatero is "naive or a brilliant statesman, who could do for the Basque Country what Tony Blair did for Northern Ireland".
"Does he really understand that the project called Spain can no longer be maintained by force, by imposition?
"And if he does, does he have the stature to persuade the Spanish state that its interests lie in the recognition that Catalonia and the Basque Country are nations, with the right to decide their own future? That the only role for Spain is to attempt to persuade us that our best interests lie in a free association with Madrid?
"If so, this is a revolution in Spanish thinking not seen for centuries."
Otegi acknowledges that this new thinking is very hard for many citizens, including a large minority of Basques, to digest.
This is partly because Madrid does continue to have "selfish, economic and strategic interests" in the Basque Country, and partly because those Basques whose first loyalty is to Madrid fear discrimination in a new Basque political entity.
Why then has ETA been so slow to respond to the unique opportunity offered by Zapatero's overtures? It has lifted death threats from local politicians, but continues to risk casualties with a bombing campaign.
Otegi responds that Batasuna and ETA, despite "a continuing battery of repression", have both made substantial contributions to opening a peace process.
He insists that the fact that ETA has not killed anyone for two years is not a consequence of its logistical collapse, but reflects a deliberate strategy.
He also cites a speech he made at Anoeta stadium in San Sebastián last November, which sets out a number of new departures.
Firstly, ETA will limit any negotiations with Madrid to purely "technical" issues - prisoners, arms and victims.
Political negotiations would be entirely in the hands of Basque political parties and ETA will accept the outcome.
All aspirations, from full independence to maintaining the status quo, will be respected, he says.
"The other big point is that this is a very plural country and that all advances will have to be made in a consensual way."
Both ETA and Batasuna used to insist that the geography of the Basque Country - the three Spanish provinces currently recognized as Basque, plus Navarre and three French provinces - was not negotiable. Otegi claims however that his movement will be flexible on these questions, seeking agreement on a calendar of phased referendums over many years, with a built-in right to opt out of any new arrangements.
He is also adamant that any future Basque administration would give full rights of citizenship to "everyone who lives and works here", regardless of their political loyalties.
"We have learned that you don't go forward by demanding the maximum of others, but by working towards agreement on a minimum acceptable to everybody."
All of this looks admirable in theory, and is a big advance on the position of Batasuna and ETA in 1998/99. However, the reality on the ground is that many Basques still live in fear, not only of ETA, but also of the "street struggle" practised, with diabolical enthusiasm, by young Batasuna supporters.
Opponents still find their cars burned out, threats painted on their homes, their offices fire-bombed.
Otegi responds to these concerns with a familiar gambit. Insofar as such fears are well-grounded, he says, they are an unfortunate consequence of the political conflict.
As long as his members are legally excluded from political office, as long as ETA prisoners are held hundreds of miles from their families, this kind of regrettable tension will continue.
"We are prepared to go all the way on the road to peace, but we have to have the company of the other parties on this journey. Otherwise we are going to look like fools."
That familiar Belfast question, who jumps first or do we all jump together, comes to mind.