An extraordinary insight into the turmoil in the Chinese Communist Party leadership in the days leading up to the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre has been provided by internal minutes and memos smuggled to the West and published here this weekend.
The papers, described as classified archives of the party, reveal the bitter differences in the octogenarian leadership over how to deal with the student sit-in in the square, disputes which led within days to the ousting of the reforming secretary general, Mr Zhao Ziyang, who had opposed a crackdown.
Authenticated by several leading experts on China, the papers are said by the New York Times to have been provided to American scholars by a Chinese figure who says he represents party members favouring faster reform. The documents, which came in the form of computer printouts, include supposed minutes of Politiburo meetings, intelligence reports and memos of meetings involving China's then paramount leader, Mr Deng Xiaoping.
The Tiananmen protests started in April as a gesture to mourn a former party reformer but turned into a vast demonstration demanding wholesale reform. The square was eventually "cleansed" at a cost put by the Chinese officially at 218 lives, but internationally believed to have run to thousands. Within the key five-member Politburo Standing Committee, the papers confirm, the leadership was split 2-2, with one abstention over whether to use force, a deadlock broken by the intervention of Mr Deng and other retired leaders who still held real power in the hierarchy.
The purge of Mr Zhao, who remains under house arrest, led to the installation of Mr Jiang Zemin, China's current president and CP general secretary, and the triumph of Mr Li Peng, now chairman of parliament and the second most senior figure in the Chinese system. Mr Li was the leading advocate in the then senior leadership of the use of force. On May 13th, Mr Zhao is reported as have pleaded with Mr Deng: "The party has to adjust to new times and situations . . . when we allow some democracy things may look "chaotic" on the surface but these little troubles are normal inside a democracy and legal framework. They prevent major upheavals and actually make for stability and peace in the long run."
On the 16th he would insist that "the vast majority of students are patriotic and sincerely concerned for our country . . . "
But Mr Deng by the 17th was arguing that although "we want to build socialist democracy we can't do it in a hurry". Multiparty elections would prompt a civil war, he said. "After thinking long and hard, I've concluded that we should bring in the People's Liberation Army and declare martial law in Beijing".
Others would be even more scathing of the students. Party elder Mr Wang Zhen on June 2nd was apoplectic with rage in response to a report from Mr Li: "Those goddamn bastards! Who do they think they are trampling on sacred ground like Tiananmen so long? They're really asking for it." On June 3rd, the morning of the massacre, Mr Li presented a minor incident in which students harassed soldiers as "a counter-revolutionary riot" and urged "decisive" measures, insisting "we must be merciless with this tiny minority of riot elements".
That night, troops moved in to clear Tiananmen Square, killing hundreds and injuring thousands in the approach streets. A military bulletin to the leadership describes one of the first clashes: "Infantrymen led the way, firing into the air. Then the soldiers - with the first two rows in a kneeling position and those in the back standing - pointed their weapons at the crowd. Approximately 10.30 p.m., under a barrage of rocks, the troops opened fire."