The reduction in the number of troops in the North has to be seen in the context of concerns that the British military is "overstretched" around the world, writes Tom Clonan.
The current two-year plan to reduce British army troop levels in Northern Ireland is part of a wider radical downsizing and restructuring of the armed forces made under successive Labour governments.
Reductions in troop numbers appear to be a de facto Labour party policy. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, at Labour's behest, the British ministry of defence (MoD) had reduced the number of soldiers serving overseas by 10,000 by December 2001.
Concurrent with this reduction was an overall cut of approximately 18 per cent in the strength of the British army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. These Labour-inspired cuts continued in 2004 with the announcement of yet more reductions, comprising 10,000 civilians working for the MoD along with a further 10,500 soldiers.
These reductions alone saw the closure of almost one-quarter of the RAF's fast jet squadrons, along with the scrapping of a dozen Royal Navy surface vessels, and the disbandment of four entire infantry battalions.
The strength of Britain's armed forces currently stands at approximately 101,000 soldiers in the army, 45,000 aircrew in the RAF and just over 40,000 sailors and marines in the Royal Navy. With around 35,000 personnel posted to Germany, 12,500 to Northern Ireland, 1,100 to the Balkans, 1,240 to the Falklands, 1,200 to the Gulf states of Qatar, Bahrain, Oman along with 400 or so to Afghanistan and 8,500 to Iraq - approximately one-quarter of Britain's armed forces are currently deployed in various locations overseas.
This is a considerable commitment and does not allow for what the British military refer to as the "ideal operational tempo" or rotation-ratio for units of one six-month tour of duty abroad followed by a two-year interval at unit-headquarters for reorganisation, recruitment and retraining.
In other words, the armed forces are currently at the elastic limit of what the general staff refer to as "overstretch". To counter "overstretch" and consistent with the MoD's Strategic Defence Review, the military authorities have sought to reorganise and reconfigure their armed forces into smaller, more nimble, brigade-sized units capable of "expeditionary" type operations.
The larger, more cumbersome division-style formations associated with the threats identified during the cold war are being phased out in favour of this scaled-down model for operational readiness and force projection - a development currently underway throughout Nato and referred to as DCI, or defence capability initiative.
The situation in Northern Ireland in recent years has led to a critical reappraisal of the numbers of British troops required to support police operations there.
At the height of the troubles, a staggering 32,000 troops were based in Northern Ireland, with a further 8,000 Ulster Defence Regiment soldiers along with approximately 13,500 heavily armed Royal Ulster Constabulary officers and reservists. This total of around 55,000 armed elements in the North was the equivalent of almost half the total current US military commitment to Iraq - a country with a population of 22 million and a geographical area equivalent of France.
Despite an IRA ceasefire that has been more or less in place for 11 years - and despite last week's announcement of a cessation of all military activity on the part of IRA volunteers - there are still around 8,800 Royal Irish Regiment (RIR) troops, both full-time soldiers and reservists, along with at least 10,000 soldiers from regular British army units based in Northern Ireland.
This brings the total number of British troops in Northern Ireland up to approximately 18,000 - more than twice the army's current commitment to Iraq.
Little wonder then that the peace process has provided momentum to Britain's plans to radically reduce troop numbers in Northern Ireland to around 5,000.
The centralised and streamlined brigade-type formation envisioned for Northern Ireland would be consistent with the overall strategic concept considered desirable for Britain's armed forces and is in step with similar military developments throughout Britain.
The proposed disbandment of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions of the RIR will doubtless provoke a loud and emotional response within some sections of the unionist community.
For sound military, political and fiscal reasons however, the demise of these units is inevitable.
This is especially so in light of Britain's participation in the current international war on terror and in the immediate aftermath of the recent London bombings.