One image, repeated countless times, dominates all others from Spain this year: ordinary citizens, in their millions, thronging streets in protest at ETA's callous murder of a young town councillor, Miguel Angel Blanco, in July.
These were the biggest anti-ETA demonstrations Spain has ever seen, comparable to the waves of popular opposition to the attempted military coup in 1981. The enormous turn-out in ETA strongholds like San Sebastian led to hopes that a watershed had finally been reached, that Basque separatist radicals would be forced to recognise that their own people massively rejected terrorist methods. Such hopes have been raised before, and it would be rash to forecast that 1997 will be remembered as the year ETA went into terminal decline. At the time of writing, another councillor from the ruling Partido Popular has just been shot dead.
There were real signs, however, that a sea-change was in progress. The harsh climate of intimidation which ETA supporters had created on the streets of the Basque region greatly diminished. A number of leading ETA members were arrested. Moderate Basque nationalists floated proposals which seemed to be drawing the radicals towards a constitutional path.
But then, in late November, a seven-year jail sentence was imposed on the entire central committee of ETA's political supporters, Herri Batasuna, which had attempted to broadcast an ETA video the previous year. The severity of the sentence may tip the delicate balance of sympathy in the Basque region back in ETA's direction.
On the economic front, matters are much less equivocal. The Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar, can look back on the conservative Partido Popular's first full calendar year in power with considerable satisfaction. The promising indicators for 1996 have all been confirmed, or even improved on. "Spanish economic fundamentals have not looked better for many years," the Economist Intelligence Unit reported in October. Inflation is just under 2 per cent and the general government deficit is expected to meet its target of 3 per cent of GDP. Spanish participation in EMU in 1999, which looked just feasible a year ago, is now a virtual certainty. Unemployment has declined to the lowest rate since 1981, though it remains chronically high at more than 20 per cent. Interest rates are likely to be well under 5.5 per cent, at least 2 per cent down on 1996.
Whether these results are due to the PP's tight fiscal policy or to the favourable economic climate is a matter of debate. The budget for 1998 suggested that the PP would be content to keep things steady rather than engage in radical restructuring. The latter would be more to the party's ideological taste, but Mr Aznar's hands remain at least partly tied because his minority government depends on Catalan and Basque Nationalist Party votes. These parties have a more benevolent approach to welfare issues than the PP, and the Catalans have clashed fiercely with Aznar on health charges.
This dependence is one of the reasons why Mr Aznar will consider calling a snap election next year. The nationalist parties have been hustling the PP down the road to full-scale federalism. This is the opposite direction to which the centralist PP promised to travel. Many Spaniards outside these regions increasingly resent the nationalists' disproportionate influence, and Aznar could pick up Socialist voters who value "the unity of Spain" over left/right preferences.
Secondly, despite the bright economic forecasts, the first years in EMU are likely to be painful in the pocket for many Spanish voters, as control of interest rates is ceded to the European Central Bank and fiscal policy becomes the main means of controlling inflation. "Spain may pass the Maastricht entrance exam and find that EMU is not a bursary," as one Spanish economist put it. A clear parliamentary majority before these tensions arise would obviously make the PP's position much more secure in the medium term.
Thirdly, next year will probably see the defeated but still very powerful Socialists (PSOE) at their lowest ebb, while doctrinal purges have virtually painted the Communists out of the big political picture. Last July, the hugely charismatic Mr Felipe Gonzalez resigned as PSOE general secretary. His successor, Mr Joaquin Alumunia, looks decent but dull. Old and new allegations of corruption and state terrorism continue to batter the PSOE's once honourable image. Left-wing nationalists hammered the party in a recent Galician poll. The nadir may be reached in spring when a former Minister for the Interior, Mr Jose Barrionuevo, finally faces charges of setting up death squads in the 1980s. Unless this trial generates sympathy for the PSOE (which is not impossible), Mr Aznar is unlikely to get a better chance to hit his opponents when they are down.
The Prime Minister will also argue that the "fear factor", in which memories of Franco's dictatorship prevented many from voting for the right in 1996, has evaporated. After 18 months in power, there is not a jackboot in sight.
Some people remain just a little fearful, however. A minority PP government has continued the task, shamefully initiated by the PSOE, of undermining the independence of the judiciary. It has shown an inordinate interest in controlling private as well as public television, and the press. It has proposed an educational policy which many regard as backward-looking. What would the PP do, it is fair to wonder, if they did win that elusive absolute majority?