THE FALL of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 is today regarded as the most triumphant event in the history of postwar Europe, the moment when the division that had for decades scarred the Continent and Germany was finally healed.
But within days of the Wall coming down, euphoria had given way to dissent as the leaders of Britain and France contemplated the imminent emergence of a united Germany.
While the initial opposition of Margaret Thatcher and of François Mitterrand to reunification has been widely documented, the full depth of both leaders’ anxieties is revealed in papers published by the British foreign office yesterday which cast fresh light on the events that followed.
On November 28th, 1989, just two weeks after the Berlin Wall came down, the then West German chancellor Helmut Kohl announced a 10-point plan for reunification without consulting either his European allies or the ruling Bonn coalition.
That blueprint triggered several private meetings between Mrs, now Baroness, Thatcher and Mr Mitterrand to discuss the German question. Memos detailing those discussions, written by Charles, now Lord, Powell, the then foreign affairs adviser to Mrs Thatcher, are among the most striking of the documents to be released.
One meeting between the two leaders was at the European Community heads of government meeting in Strasbourg on December 8th. Mr Powell relates that Mr Mitterrand spoke critically of Mr Kohl, saying that he had no understanding of other nations’ sensitivities and was exploiting German “national” feeling.
Another notable encounter took place over lunch at the Elysée palace on January 20th, 1990. Mr Powell reports that Mr Mitterrand talked about how reunification would see the re-emergence of the “bad” Germans who had once dominated Europe.
According to the memo, Mr Mitterrand at one point said that if Chancellor Kohl were to get his way, Germany could win more ground than Hitler ever did and that Europe would have to bear the consequences.
Mr Mitterrand goes on to warn Mrs Thatcher that if Germany were to expand territorially in Europe, the Continent would be back to where it had been one year before the first World War.
But unlike the British prime minister, he acknowledged that no force in Europe would be able to stop it happening.
The documents do not simply provide fresh insights into Mr Mitterrand’s position. They also reveal the scale of the confrontation between Mrs Thatcher and the British foreign office.
The documents show that British diplomats realised as early as January 1989 that German reunification was a possibility. But after the Wall had fallen, they feared Mrs Thatcher was adopting a stance so shrill that no one – least of all the White House – was paying attention to it.
Mrs Thatcher clearly despaired of the advice she was getting from Sir Christopher Mallaby, the British ambassador to Bonn.
She believed he was too soft on reunification and had an “alarming” view of it. Sir Christopher’s fear, however, was that Britain was ending up on the wrong side of the argument – and that the UK was being castigated in Germany as “the least important” of the western allies.
Mrs Thatcher’s opposition to unification has long been seen as a historic misjudgement. By January 1990, there were already signs that her attitude was becoming less doctrinaire, as some of the documents reveal.
There are indications, meanwhile, that Mr Mitterrand may have been playing a wily game, baiting Mrs Thatcher into making increasingly hostile public statements on reunification that marginalised Britain. He himself had other aims. While he may have been concerned about reunification, his real ambition was to steer a wider Germany into the project of European Monetary Union and a united Europe. – Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
Reunification: Ireland's role
As holder of the first presidency of the European Council after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Ireland played an important role in the delicate manoeuvrings that eventually led to the reunification of Germany on October 3rd, 1990.
After taking the helm of the council in January 1990, Ireland hosted an extraordinary meeting of the council in Dublin on April 28th. It was at this gathering that EU leaders, despite the initial reservations held by Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand, agreed a common approach on German unification.
"We are pleased that German unification is taking place under a European roof," read the meeting's concluding statement. "The community will ensure that the integration of the territory of the German Democratic Republic into the community is accomplished in a smooth and harmonious way. The European Council is satisfied that this integration will contribute to faster economic growth in the community, and agrees that it will take place in conditions of economic balance and monetary stability."
Noel Dorr, who was then secretary-general at the Department of Foreign Affairs, said the timing of the meeting was paramount. "Having that council meeting half-way through the presidency fitted very well with the tempo of events," he recalls. Then taoiseach Charles Haughey was sympathetic to Germany's position.
Six years later, then German chancellor Dr Helmut Kohl would pay tribute to Ireland's work in those crucial months during an official visit to the State. Speaking at Dublin Castle, Dr Kohl said many people had been sceptical of German unification, but that "You helped us. You stood by us."
He spoke of the warm friendship between the German and Irish people and the need to build a "solid European house".
MARY FITZGERALD