HISTORY: The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War By Andrew Roberts Allen Lane (Penguin), 711pp. £25
THIS IS NOT, as the title claims, a new history of the second World War but it is a very good one; although military history buffs will not find many dramatic revelations here about the major events of the conflict, Andrew Roberts’s flair for detail and lively writing make this a particularly engaging survey that fully captures the war’s scale and horror: no easy task for a conflagration that lasted for 2,174 days, cost $1.5 trillion and killed over 50 million people – 23,000 lives a day.
From the German invasion of Poland to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Roberts dissects the poor strategic decision-making that ultimately lost the Axis the war, covering the full global range of the conflict’s many battles, in theatres as far flung as Kursk, Tunisia and Burma. His key conclusions will not surprise: Hitler made a serious error in his decision to invade Russia in 1941, launching Germany into a two-front war, an error compounded by his failure to provide his army with winter clothing and his decision to take Kiev in July 1941, rather than focusing on conquering Moscow. Hitler’s continual prioritising of Nazi ideology over military aims damaged his chances of achieving his objectives, most famously when he refused any strategic retreat at Stalingrad, which cost him the Sixth Army; his belief that retreat was weakness and incompatible with Nazi ideals – evident again in his “Stand or die” order to German forces in the Po valley in April 1945 – constantly frustrated his generals, the sycophantic “golden pheasants” of the regime, whose military advice was disregarded at the Führer’s whim.
The Germans also failed to harness nationalist discontent against the Soviet regime in the areas of the USSR they occupied, such as the Ukraine, to build support for a new, German-dominated Europe; they were too busy implementing Nazi policies of annihilation, alongside their ongoing Holocaust of Europe’s Jews: “The purpose of the Russian campaign is to decimate the Slavic population by 30 millions,” Himmler declared. As Roberts points out, this horrific outcome was almost attained: the final Russian death toll in the war was 27 million lives.
In stark contrast to the Allies, the Axis powers also failed to coordinate their military campaigns; famously Mussolini never informed Hitler of his attack on Greece; Hitler returned the favour, not informing Mussolini of his planned invasion of Yugoslavia.
Japan also did not declare war on Russia in conjunction with the German Barbarossa invasion. Yet Hitler foolishly gambled by declaring war on the United States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, despite the fact that under the Tripartite agreement he was under no obligation to do so.
This was the death knell for the German war effort, for, as Roberts states, if Britain “provided the time and Russia the blood necessary to defeat the Axis, it was America that produced the weapons”.
Against the United States, with its industrial colossus safely beyond the reach of German bombers, the Third Reich was effectively economically outmanoeuvred; neither Germany, Italy nor Japan could compete with the armaments America now pumped into the war, producing 296,000 aircraft, 86,333 tanks, 12.5 million rifles, and mobilising 14.9 million people in total.
Add to this the fact the Allies had cracked the German Enigma code and Axis defeat was only a matter of time – an Allied victory purchased dearly in the annals of human suffering.
Heather Jones is lecturer in international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science