The third and perhaps greatest challenge facing the EU is that of maintaining and, if possible, developing public support. The problem, of course, should not be exaggerated. Put in its simplest terms, "Europe" has a great deal more support than "non-Europe".
Each member-state's membership of the EU and participation in its further development have the assent of its people expressed through a democratically-elected government and parliament and, in some cases, also directly through referenda. Moreover, the EU itself is, of its nature, deeply embedded in the democratic process. It has a directly elected Parliament. Each memberstate is represented in the Council of Ministers by its elected government. Each national parliament contributes to the establishment of its government's policy in Europe.
However, there is undoubtedly a sense, to one degree or another in every member-state, that Europe is something apart, something that happens elsewhere - in Brussels or Strasbourg or Luxembourg.
In some member-states at least, this sense has grown in recent years. It is not that Europe is not relevant to public concerns (although it can always be made more relevant) but rather that its relevance is often not explained or understood.
There are people in every member-state who firmly oppose the concept of European integration. In most cases, they are a relatively small minority. Part of the challenge of public support is to win over such people, although there is no doubt that some of them will hold on to their quite legitimate point of view. There is, however, a different, wider and in some senses more important challenge of public support. It is the challenge not of selling Europe to the hostile few but of explaining Europe to the indifferent many.
The level of media coverage of the EU is not remotely commensurate with Europe's importance to people's lives. Take my own country, for example. In Ireland, the quality and extent of media coverage of Europe are impressive in comparison with many member-states. (One anecdote will illustrate this. I was informed, when I spent some days in the House of Lords several years ago, that the section of its library dealing with European issues took two daily newspapers - the Financial Times and The Irish Times. It takes some quality for an Irish newspaper to find itself a preferred choice in that bastion of British tradition).
Irish people, moreover, are relatively interested in public and international affairs. However, even in a country like Ireland, the EU accounts for only a very small proportion of media coverage. This relative sparsity of coverage bears no relation to the significance for the Irish economy and for Irish society more generally of the decisions taken in Europe.
Of course, the relatively limited media coverage of Europe, in most if not all member-states, should not be seen as the "fault" of the media. The quality of the coverage, if not its quantity or its reach, is often very impressive. (Still less is it my intention to criticise the media in Ireland. The fact that a problem of public comprehension exists even in a member-state with relatively good media coverage of Europe merely serves to underline the extent of the problem).
Moreover, politicians, civil servants, interest groups, the education system at all levels, and the European institutions must also play their part in explaining Europe. Indeed, people themselves have to make a significant effort if they wish to understand the workings of the Union.
There appears in a sense to be a vicious circle. Many people are bored by Europe because they do not understand it. They do not understand Europe because of the limited coverage which it receives. It receives limited coverage because people are bored by it.
Perhaps the main reason for this phenomenon is that people everywhere in the Union still identify with the local - the local face, the local issue, the local scandal. To an extent at least, national politics is also seen as local. The EU, by contrast, is still perceived as something a little distant, a little incomprehensible. It is seen as a fact of life which affects us rather than a process which we can help to shape. Europe is seen as something we participate in rather than part of what we are.
The challenge is to overcome the boredom, to unshroud the mystery, to show that Europe too is local in its relevance. Much has already been done to address this challenge, to make Europe more transparent and comprehensible and alert to the concerns of citizens. However, a great deal more remains to be done.
During the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, each delegation attached central importance to its public opinion, to ensuring that the treaty emerging from the negotiations would have sufficient popular support at home. One of the five main themes of the IGC was "Europe and the Citizen". Another of the themes, "Freedom, Security and Justice", also grew directly from the desire to address the concerns of citizens, notably as regards the fight against crime.
Perhaps the most fundamental shift in the Union's priorities represented by the Treaty of Amsterdam was that the concerns of citizens were moved centre-stage. The conduct of the IGC was also much more open than had been the case with previous IGCs.
But addressing the concerns of citizens at the IGC and being seen to address those concerns was much easier said than done for several reasons, of which I will mention three.
First, the levers for addressing such concerns - such as unemployment or the fight against crime - are often in the hands of national governments. One of the concerns of many citizens is precisely that such issues should remain in the hands of national governments. It is not that people do not want action at European level on these issues; on the contrary. The paradox is that people often do want more action at European level but not at the expense of national prerogatives.
Second, an IGC concerns solely the negotiation of changes to the EU's treaties, not the subsequent development of concrete policies on the basis of the treaty provisions agreed. An IGC, therefore, strengthens the basis for future action but does not itself implement the action provided for. The language in the Treaty of Amsterdam on justice and home affairs, for example, is inevitably couched in legal terms and may appear a far cry from the practical police co-operation which will flow from it.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, public concerns differ very significantly from one member-state to another. Some delegations may, therefore, press for more action at European level on, say, the environment or employment. Others may press for more action on fraud or for improved decision-making or for a greater role for national parliaments.
Furthermore, public concerns are sometimes even directly contradictory from one member-state to another. Most obviously, for example, the governments of larger member-states would like to be able tell their electorates that they have won more influence in the Union at the expense of the smaller member-states. The governments of the smaller member-states would like to be able to tell their electorates that no such shift has taken place.
For some governments, to cite another example, a further step towards a common defence policy would represent a strong selling point at home. For others, the opposite is the case.
Finally, Europe faces what I call the challenge of identity. The fact is that decisions are taken at European level and in the European interest by people who continue to think largely in national terms.
The simple fact is that the pursuit of national interests remains at the heart of the EU. In my view that is not something to be deplored, although the lowest national common denominator can end up serving the interests of no one. Nor, on the other hand, is it a badge of honour to be trumpeted under the banner of sovereignty, although it does reflect the workings of democracy at the present stage of the Union's development.
The continued pursuit of national interests should be seen simply for the fact which it is. If the fact is ignored it will not go away; rather it risks becoming a festering sore. If, on the other hand, the reality of national interest is recognised, it can be transformed slowly so that it is seen increasingly as embracing the wider European interest.
Trampling on national interests or concerns would offer no basis for progress. Pretending that they are a thing of the past is the simple self-delusion of the ostrich. The challenge is to be aware of national interests and sensitivities, to accommodate them and to encourage their gradual "sea-change/ into something rich and strange".
Original Sin In A Brave New World by Bobby McDonagh, with a fore- word by Jacques Santer, is published by the Institute of European Affairs, price £15.
