The severity of the penalties imposed on the Irish Farmers' Association for disobeying a court injunction has taken many, including the IFA itself, by surprise.

Certainly, if the IFA blockade had lasted long enough to attract a penalty of £500,000 a day, the total amount would have broken most records. Even as it stands, the penalty payable must rank as one of the highest, if not the highest, in the State's history.

Needless to say, both the farmers and the meat-processors feel aggrieved over the various financial losses they have sustained in this dispute. The courts, however, have a more limited but still vital role, which is to uphold the law. The action of the farmers was unlawful; that seems to be agreed. Furthermore, it was the kind of unlawful action which demanded a speedy and effective remedy.

The injunction is just such a remedy. It is one of the most powerful weapons in the law's armoury. A temporary injunction restraining somebody from doing something can be obtained very quickly, even outside normal court hours.

Secondly, a breach of an injunction is punishable as contempt of court, which means anyone who disobeys it can be imprisoned.

For this reason, the injunction is often a more effective remedy than the criminal law. After all, criminal charges take time to process. There is no guarantee that the defendant will be convicted, and there is no guarantee that the sentence imposed, especially if in the form of a fine, will be sufficient to deter future offending. The principal issue in the farmers' case is simply the rule of law. The courts are the ultimate forum for the enforcement of the law. Unless their orders are obeyed, the entire social order is endangered.

If one group, no matter how meritorious its case, is allowed to disobey a court order with impunity, other groups or individuals may feel free to do the same. For this reason, it was predictable that the courts would respond severely to the farmers' wilful disobedience of the injunction.

The question of whether the law is just, or whether the farmers think they have a moral as opposed to a legal justification for their action is irrelevant for this purpose. They are essentially political questions. The role of the High Court is simply to ensure that its orders are obeyed.

Imprisonment would generally be the punishment for breach of an injunction. In this case the judge felt it would be inadequate. He therefore decided to impose heavy fines instead, and that proved to be very effective.

The questions of whether the fines were excessive will doubtless be debated for some time to come. There are no guidelines, formal or otherwise, on the penalties appropriate in a case like this. Indeed, such guidelines would be virtually impossible to draw up because of the diversity of circumstances in which they may have to apply.

I would suggest, however, as a general principle that any penalties imposed on organisations for breach of an injunction can quite legitimately punish and deter, but they should not, if possible, destroy.

In other words, if the offending organisation otherwise serves a legitimate and useful social purpose, as the IFA certainly does, there is a social interest in allowing it to remain in existence. Needless to say, there is also a strong social interest in ensuring the continued existence of the businesses which are the victims of the offending action. The two considerations must be balanced.

The IFA has taken the prudent step of dissociating itself from any further protests at the meat plants. As it is no longer disobeying the injunctions, it will not suffer any further penalties. But those who continue to protest leave themselves open to similar legal action and could, of course, face financial ruin if they are eventually punished in the same way as the IFA. They should therefore proceed with great caution.

Tom O'Malley lectures in law at NUI Galway