President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland flies to Belgrade today for what was being billed last night as a crucial meeting with President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia amid expectations that Belgrade's agreement to the G8 principles on Kosovo means a diplomatic breakthrough may be imminent.
These five principles are central to resolving the crisis - but they are not the same as NATO's own, far more explicit demands, and it is hard to see how the gaps between NATO and Belgrade on at least two vital points can be bridged.
The principles were agreed at Petersberg, near Bonn, on May 6th by the foreign ministers of the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan - the Group of Seven leading industrial powers - and Russia. They represented the lowest common denominator of what was acceptable to these five core NATO allies and Russia - then, as now, bitterly opposed to the NATO action against Yugoslavia. But the alliance was desperate to find a way to keep Moscow, angry and alienated, engaged in the diplomatic process.
Point one is the easiest. This demands an "immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo". The key word here is "verifiable" because of the need for firm evidence before NATO would agree a halt in the bombing. Linked to this is the far more problematic Point two: "Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces." Crucially, this avoids any qualification, because then, as now, it remains one of the hardest nuts to crack.
Russia's position is unclear, but it appears to be closer to the Serbs than NATO, talking of allowing a "few thousand" Serbs to stay behind.
Gen Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of Yugoslavia's Third Army, was quoted yesterday as saying Belgrade would demand the troop levels that existed "before the aggression started". Last October Mr Milosevic was allowed to keep 16,650 troops and special police in Kosovo. By mid-November, levels were over 22,000, so that could be an opening bargaining position. If so, Mr Milosevic will either have to come down a very long way or NATO will have to fudge a central and non-negotiable demand.
NATO insists on a full withdrawal, though it has made clear informally - via talks between the US deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, and the Russian envoy, Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin, that some "hundreds" of Serb personnel could return to liaise with an international force, help clear mines, guard historic sites and provide a symbolic Yugoslav presence at main border posts.
Point three: "Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives." NATO insists it must provide the command and control of any security presence - and the key word in this sentence is "effective". NATO argues that a UN force, for example, would not be effective for both political and practical reasons.
RUSSIA has accepted this in principle and is prepared to send troops to serve alongside NATO, as in Bosnia's S-For. But Western diplomats say it is still pushing for "zonal" arrangements. In one version of this, Kosovo would be divided into three: Russian forces in the north, neutrals in the centre and NATO in the south. NATO says this is unacceptable because it would mean de facto partition and would not provide enough confidence for hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees to return home - which is what is meant by the tortuous phrase "common objectives" in the G8 document.
Yugoslavia's position - repeated by Gen Pavkovic yesterday - is that it will accept a force composed only of NATO countries which have not been involved in "the aggression". But one alliance official said last night: "Without troops from those allies Milosevic would be able to manipulate the peace mission like plasticine".
Point four: "Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations [ensuring] conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo." This is easier than the other points, although Russia is calling for a major role to be played by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 54-member pan-European security body, while NATO prefers the EU.
Russia's backing will be vital to agree the security council resolution required to codify all this - and restore a badly needed sense of UN legitimacy.
RUSSIA is likely to back this if it contains sufficient references to the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of the federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Both these points - referred to at the end of the G8 document - are also crucial to the Serbs.
Point five: "The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations." This is the only one of the G8 principles that is identical to one of NATO's own demands.
"I am curious rather than excited," one key NATO official said last night. "There is still a fair gap between the Russian position and ours. It would be nice if Milosevic was about to cave in - but there is no expectation that we are at that point. Milosevic chooses his words carefully. When he says he has accepted the G8 principles, we hear what he is saying. But he is not saying he accepts NATO's demands. That is what he needs to say."
