Israel did not enter Lebanon 18 years ago to win a war. It did so in response to a protracted series of cross-border attacks, causing untold damage to life and home and forcing over a quarter of a million people to huddle in bomb-shelters.
The earlier reports on Lebanon last week are now giving way to more sober analyses of the developments - as well they should.
In the peculiar rush of some commentators to find "victors" or "vanquished", they have misunderstood the complexities of the situation.
With war waged upon it from a country whose leadership was unable to exercise authority, it was the duty of the Israeli government to do its utmost to facilitate normality for its citizens. Responsible governments the world over would have acted likewise.
Yet we knew already then that no fail-safe solution was possible in a country which defied all logic. Lebanon had long before ceased to exist as an independent entity, with 30,000 Syrian troops overseeing every move, and with militias of all shapes, sizes and allegiances running amok.
The violence against our northern towns and communities continued, with the Iranian-armed Hizbullah shooting from within civilian enclaves and near UNIFIL positions, in the knowledge of the consequences of retaliation.
The public debate in Israel over the presence in Lebanon started on day one and it was clear that the time would come when the security zone, with its inherent imperfections, would outlive its usefulness.
Indeed, the divisions caused by the presence in Lebanon directly affected at least three general elections.
During the run-up to the last of these, Ehud Barak pledged to pullout Israeli forces within one year of his election. The optimal scenario would have been to do so within the framework of an agreement with Syria, to which the Lebanese government is subservient.
But when it became clear that peace with Syria would not be achieved within the specified timeframe, Mr Barak carried out his pledge under a more dangerous scenario, that of a unilateral withdrawal.
We knew there would be those who would simplistically talk of defeat. Operationally-speaking, the pull-back went relatively peacefully, taking even some self-proclaimed Lebanon experts by surprise.
The elation on the faces of the Israeli soldiers after leaving Lebanon, hopefully for ever, and their mothers was apparent. Yet it was tempered by deep apprehension over the serious risks we face.
Frightening questions abound. Will the heavily Iranian-armed Hizbullah, with its ideology that calls for the "eradication of the cancerous growth of Zionism" refrain from attacking us? Will Syria restrain its Hizbullah proxy? What will become of the 30,000 Syrian troops controlling Lebanon? Will Syria allow the Lebanese army to take control of the south? What will be the relationship between the Muslims and Christians in southern Lebanon?
Israel's experience of Lebanese history and intelligence reports of recent Syrian activity are hardly conducive to optimism, yet these are the realities we are left with on the ground, when the headlines subside.
The ball is squarely in the Syrians' court. They know the consequences of further attacks against Israel from the country they run, and indeed have unleashed the Hizbullah in the past as political bargaining chips. The stakes today, however, are much higher.
Syria and Lebanon can make the strategic policy change to bring about peace in the area. If Lebanon were now to exercise its sovereignty and promote harmony with those Christians and Muslims who joined Israel in resisting the Hizbullah, it would signal its preference for internal rapprochement and unity over continued blood-letting. Those two countries can use the withdrawal as a leverage to attain wider peace in the region. It is true that Israel's security is its own responsibility and in spite of its long co-operation with UNIFIL and highest regard for it, the UN force would be the first to recognise it is not in Lebanon to defend Israel.
Yet now that Israel has fully complied with UN Resolution 425, there is no outstanding issue between it and Lebanon that could not be resolved almost immediately. There is no reason why a peace accord cannot be achieved between the two countries.
On the Syrian track, Israel has already made clear its willingness to take risks for peace, unrelated to Lebanon. Hopefully, the new reality will convince the Syrians that Israel's intentions are unambiguous and honest. If Syria and Lebanon were to take the bull by the horns, they would find Israel ready and willing to build a new future of peace and prosperity. We pray that the opportunity will not be lost.
Mark Sofer is Israeli ambassador to Ireland.
