Achieving nuclear weapons status has become much easier since the end of the cold war. The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant the collapse of the system of security and control over the world's greatest supply of nuclear weapons and materials.

Between 1992 and 1995 there were six confirmed cases of serious nuclear theft and smuggling. Hundreds of reports were also made of other incidents and attempts.

There are storage facilities with nuclear materials in coffee jars protected only by basic locks. The security system in Russia is not designed to combat insider threats.

It relied on a Soviet police state with heavily-policed borders. The authorities did not invest in the closed-circuit cameras, motion detectors and other sophisticated technology that are commonplace at US nuclear facilities. They also lack proper inventories.

As a result nobody is aware of the amount of uranium or plutonium in many of the facilities. They cannot detect crimes if they are not aware that anything is missing.

Nuclear weapons are not hard to construct. The only tricky part is the production of plutonium or of highly enriched uranium. This is technically difficult and usually massively expensive. However, it is no longer a problem if it is available on the black market at a fraction of the cost.

There is no shortage of demand for such materials in Russia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and other rogue states. Little is known about their actions in this regard. But given that intelligence operations have been shown to be hopelessly ineffective in this area, it is unlikely that anything will be apparent until it is too late.

Terrorist groups are also in the market. These organisations have shown restraint by refraining from causing mass carnage, but this is changing.

New organisations are unconcerned about public perception. Often motivated by violent religious beliefs, they are likely to become more active in the future.

The use of the chemical weapon saran in a Tokyo subway and the attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre indicate a new breed of terrorist intent on causing maximum damage.

The harsh reality is that little can be done to stop this once the materials are in the open. Comprehensive detection equipment capable of finding nuclear materials in normal circumstances belongs only in the future and in Hollywood movies.

The means of delivery are endless and are virtually certain to be free from the interference of law enforcement. The problems caused by last week's tests will be minuscule compared with what is to come unless radical action is taken.

There is no obvious solution to this problem. The Russian nuclear complex is incredibly vast and diverse. There are vested interests in Russia that wish to deny the existence of a problem. In addition, the money is not available in Russia to meet the needs of the industry.

The United States has initiated an effort to improve security, convert military plants for civilian use, restrain weapons scientists, and develop accurate inventories.

However these projects, known collectively as the Nunn-Lugar programmes, have been crippled by a hostile Congress which resents what it sees as foreign aid to, and welfare spending on, Russia. As a result the programme is burdened by restrictions that hinder progress.

It is also allocated a measly sum. Spending in 1997 accounted for $519 million - less than one fifth of one per cent of the overall defence budget. To put it in context, $2 billion was spent on US operations in Haiti and over $60 billion was spent by the international community in the Gulf War.

If the Americans are coming up short, the Europeans are almost nowhere to be seen.

It was an Irish idea that led to the non-proliferation treaty in the first place. Perhaps Mr Andrews could take the next logical step and urge the EU to tackle the threat in its new form.

Tom Wright is researching nuclear proliferation at the Politics Department, University College, Dublin.