SINCE the Downing Street Declaration publicly launched the process in December 1993, the two governments have pursued a common objective: a comprehensive settlement in Northern Ireland through all party talks. The route to those talks has been long and tortuous. At last we have arrived, only to find the celebrations muted. And it is not difficult to see why.

Most obviously, the governments' has been only partial barring last minute drama, they will not be all party talks, at least at the beginning.

I disagree with those who say they are therefore worthless. Without Sinn Fein a key dimension is missing, but an agreement reached by the representatives of 85 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland is better than no agreement.

I suspect there is more apprehension than joy among the delegates: fear of the political unknown fear of being trapped into a concession too far; fear of betraying the fundamentals of their tradition.

The months ahead are surely the most critical and challenging for British and Irish political leadership since the conception, birth and infancy of the Free State.

On the Conservative backbenches we shall be following events closely. We applaud the Prime Minister's commitment to the search for a comprehensive settlement. We respect Sir Patrick Mayhew's integrity and tenacity. Most of us with greatest interest in Northern Ireland are staunch unionists with our own agenda, of sorts.

Perhaps our fundamental belief is that the interests of the people of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are best protected and promoted by the Union; that our influence in world councils is greater because of the Union; that our combined economies count for more because of it; that as a United Kingdom we can therefore more effectively resist the advancing tide of Europe.

We therefore have an interest in the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Our interest is partly strategic (in a political, not military, sense). Our interest is partly economic. But it is not selfish.

We argue that the Union is equally in the interests of the people of Northern Ireland and it is entirely dependent on their democratically expressed wish.

The Framework Documents have found little support among my colleagues. Writing in the Daily Telegraph, Proinsias De Rossa acknowledged "some positive developments in unionist thinking" but regretted that "there is still a distinct coolness towards the Joint Framework Document." Many Conservative unionists share this coolness.

On decommissioning, we have agreed with John Hume (and others); you cannot negotiate with people who have guns on the table, under the table or outside the door.

The Downing Street Declaration made it clear. Only those parties "which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process . . . are free to join in dialogue".

Surely Albert Reynolds is being mischievous when he claims that there was no British demand for decommissioning until appreciably after the Declaration, The process appears to have generated its own mythology.

Two months before the Declaration Sir Patrick Mayhew had made clear the government's insistence on decommissioning (RTE Radio; October 13th, 1993).

Dick Spring was singing from the same hymn sheet on the day of the Declaration: We are talking about the handing up of weapons he said in the Dail (Dail Debates, Vol. 437 c.776). Even if Albert Reynolds did not know, Mr Gerry Adams did.

In an interview with the Irish News three weeks later he condemned the British insistence on prior decommissioning (January 8th, 1994).

Many of my colleagues believe the greatest mistake has been the retreat on decommissioning. It undermined the Downing Street Declaration principle of non violence. It gave the wrong signal to the Provisionals, encouraging the belief that obduracy on their part would be rewarded bye compromise on the part of the two governments. We accept decommissioning in parallel as second best.

Before Canary Wharf the Provisionals were under pressure. The IRA had to prove the ceasefire was permanent. Although the British had given way to Dublin on decommissioning, the Mitchell principles had embarrassed Sinn Fein and Mitchell had recommended decommissioning in parallel. There was no firm date for talks. Sinn Fein complained bitterly about preconditions.

The docklands bomb blew all that apart. Within days a date had been set for all party talks. Sinn Fein would be admitted if the ceasefire was reinstated. The IRA's refusal to decommission before a comprehensive settlement found support. Nationalists appeared eager to stretch the formula in every conceivable way to woo the Provisionals. It did not work.

I first became chairman of the Conservative Northern Ireland committee in 1992. For four fascinating years as the process has advanced I have enjoyed privileged observer status, more than occasionally penetrating the inner sanctuaries of government to observe policy making at first hand. From time to time I have tried to influence the course of events.

I do not believe that the circumstances in which the talks are taking place are as propitious as they might have been. Mistakes have been made. In not every case has hindsight been needed to recognise this.

Nevertheless, I believe that a comprehensive settlement can still be achieved, difficult though this will be, even without Sinn Fein.

Whatever happens, even if the talks fail, I cannot believe we will drift back to the bad old days. In Northern Ireland, there is an almost tangible yearning for permanent peace.

People want a settlement. Politicians have been challenged by the process. Our thinking is broader because of it. Now we must see what the politicians can deliver.