The political conditions set out for the Stormont talks were, from an Irish republican viewpoint, an absolute surrender. These were based on the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993, followed by the Framework Documents in 1995 and later the Mitchell Principles. All of these accepted totally the unionist veto, whereby 18 per cent of the population of Ireland would dictate to the remaining 82 per cent.
Given such terms of reference, the most that could eventuate was another "power-sharing" Stormont and emasculated cross-Border bodies which could not grow into all-Ireland organs of government.
In the outcome on Good Friday we have seen British rule in Ireland strengthened and updated. Nationalists, for the first time - apart from five months in 1974 - will be in executive positions in Stormont administering the Six Counties as part of the so-called United Kingdom, thus making British rule more deeply rooted.
Furthermore, the "new-look" Stormont will be presented worldwide as a "settlement", thus making it more acceptable to the international community. Britain, while retaining sovereignty and absolute possession of the Six Counties, will be doing a Pontius Pilate washing of hands before the world at large.
The cross-Border bodies will be accountable to the New Stormont which will have an in-built unionist majority, as was intended when the Border was drawn 78 years ago. Accordingly, their growth and development will be controlled by unionists and the "transition" model being mooted in certain quarters will not work. Far from being a transitionary phase towards a free and independent Ireland, the Belfast Agreement is a stepping-stone away from it.
The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 contained a stronger Council of Ireland. Mr Cosgrave, then Taoiseach, when negotiating it, did not give away Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution, nor did he accept a Council of the [British] Isles which could pave the way for the return of the 26 Counties into a federated United Kingdom. More has been given for less on this occasion.
The old Stormont, as a barrier administration between the Irish people and the British government, was brought down at great cost by the people's struggle in 1972. How much more difficult will it be to remove the new one, updated, strengthened and with much patronage to dispense? Money seems to be available from many quarters these days!
It is necessary to separate the constitutional and civil/human rights issues in any consideration of this question. Mr Blair stated on television from Israel shortly after Easter that "the constitutional question between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland was not on the table" at the Stormont talks, but everything else was. He might have added that the only constitutional concessions made were by Mr Ahern's Government in Dublin.
Cross-Border bodies have actually been in existence since the early 1950s, e.g. the Foyle Fisheries and Carlingford Lough Commissions, the joint railway operations, the control of animal diseases and indeed tourism. These have gone about their work quietly for almost 50 years. There is no question of these growing into something which was never intended, nor can the new bodies, which are projected to deal with what are largely peripheral areas of administration.
Mr Hume has said that it is people and not territory that count. Under the new agreement, the British will retain a territorial claim on all of the Six Counties regardless of people's wishes. The 1998 Agreement states in Annex A 1. (1) "Northern Ireland in its entirety . . ." (my italics).
If Britain can hold six Irish counties because of a local majority there, and if people, not territory, count, then why cannot the nationalist majority in four counties (Fermanagh, Tyrone, Derry and Armagh) detach themselves from the other two? This is not to advocate repartition, but just to question the validity of a proposition. But territory is important to Britain, otherwise why did she annex Rockall in a two-line Act of Parliament in 1972? The answer lies in the fisheries and mineral wealth in its territorial waters.
The British Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was part of the response to all-Ireland self-determination in the 1918 election and in the Declaration of Independence of the First (32-county) Dail. The unit of franchise and of decision was sundered by this Act, which partitioned Ireland and imposed the Stormont regime. No Irish vote, either unionist or nationalist, was cast for it, yet now we are being asked to endorse a new Stormont by referendums on the same day in two geographical fragments of Ireland.
This is "what is available" (John Bruton's words), and the alternative is all-out war, we are told. Bertie Ahern said as much on RTE radio on Easter Sunday in reply to a question about half-page advertisements taken in Irish daily papers by eight leading and mainstream Irish-American organisations the previous day. The advertisement called for a rejection of changes in Articles 2 and 3 and said: "A just peace will only come when Ireland is free from British control."
Fianna Fail posters tell us we must "Vote Yes for Peace". David Trimble stated in Minnesota that the Orange Order would walk when and where it liked and on his return said the alternative to the agreement was "30 years of misery". Davy Adams, spokesman at the recent UDP (which reflects UDA thinking) conference, said rejection would mean "violence on a scale never witnessed before".
Clearly Lloyd George's threat of "immediate and terrible war" in 1921 is being repeated these days. As Liam Mellowes said at that time: "This is the fear of the people, not the will of the people". To this end 15 uninvolved nationalists were killed last year and 12 this year already.
It is not a free vote because of the threat of force and it is not a single referendum. Mo Mowlam and Patrick Mayhew before her said it is the "vote in the North" which will count. Further, republicans believe British rule here cannot be legitimised "except by the destruction of the Irish people" (1916 Proclamation).
EITHER there is or there is not a historic Irish nation whose homeland is the island of Ireland. Republicans accept there is and agree with James Connolly's court-martial statement that "the British government has no right in Ireland, never had any right in Ireland and never can have any right in Ireland".
The alternative to the Stormont deal is, in Strand One, a nine-county Ulster parliament with almost every power of government; in Strand Two co-operation with the other three provinces in foreign affairs, national defence and overall financing; and in Strand Three a Celtic League providing for co-operation between a free Ireland and independent Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man and even Cornwall and Brittany. In an article for the Belfast Telegraph on January 20th, 1995, I expanded on this.
It is vital that unionists and other minorities are not backed on to a cliff edge politically. "A new Ireland cannot be the old Ireland in disguise", in John Robb's words. The way forward to such is through an elected 32-County Constituent Assembly with the sole task of drawing up a new constitution for the whole island. Britain would leave with the new arrangement in place and working.
The English ruling class must be made to think again. "What is available" must be extended to encompass disengagement over a period of years. People should vote No on both sides of the Border and send the British Establishment back to the drawing board.