THE launch of the first supertanker in the early 1960s was hailed as a triumph of marine engineering but there were pessimists who feared the consequences of an accident at sea. In March 1967, this pessimism was justified when the Torrey Canyon, bound for Milford Haven in Wales, ran on to the Seven Sisters Rocks off Land's End and spilled 119,000 tonnes of Kuwaiti crude. Thereafter the names of stricken tankers became household words the Amoco Cadiz, the Exxon Valdez, the Braer and now the Sea Empress.
It is too early to assess the environmental impact of this latest incident "but it will certainly be immensely serious. Local people will look back to 10 years ago when a much smaller tanker, the Bridgeness, went aground in the same area, and they will remember that although only 167 tonnes of oil escaped, around 130 km of shore was affected and 5,000 sea birds died.
The Sea Empress was carrying 136,000 tonnes and the scale of the damage will be commensurately greater. Already, sea birds have been killed off south west Wales, fishing has been interrupted and shores contaminated. The outcome will depend to some extent on the changing force and direction of the wind but oil has reached the Isle of Skomer, one of Britain's two marine nature reserves.
The story is depressingly familiar. Nearly 30 years after the Torrey Canyon, have we learnt nothing from successive experiences of oil spills? In fact, a great many lessons have been learned about the use of detergents and their replacement by relatively non toxic dispersants about the possibility of containing and picking up oil from the sea about optional clean up procedures ashore, and about when to act and when to leave things to nature. Also, in Britain, there are contingency plans for the coastline and guidelines for the most environmentally sensitive areas.
There are stocks of clean up equipment stored at strategic points round the coast and supplies of dispersants available for aircraft to spray.
ALL these measures, however, relate only to the aftermath of a spill. After the Braer incident at Shetland in 1993, it was felt that as well as the usual detailed examination of a the specific events, there should be a broader review. Lord Donaldson was asked to inquire into how the UK coast could be protected from pollution by merchant shipping.
His report was published in May 1994. As well as dealing with cleanup measures, it examined emergency procedure for ships in distress. The report made a 13 part recommendation for a system to ensure that tugs with adequate salvage capacity should be available at key points around the UK shores. It also suggested how these tugs might be staffed and administered. But the thrust of the Donaldson report was its recognition that the best approach was to prevent accidents. Thus, it looked at a spectrum of issues ranging from ship structure, design and maintenance, through navigation, routing and tracking, to manning, handling and crew training.
The report was regarded as a blueprint for action and, of its 103 recommendations, the government immediately accepted 86 and agreed to consider another 13. As a result, many substantial improvements have been made, others are in hand, while some are delayed by the need for international consultation and agreement.
It is against this background of vastly improved safety consciousness that we come back to the central question of this week's disaster how was the Sea Empress accident able to occur? Must we conclude that such sporadic accidents will always be a feature of transporting oil? It has been suggested that immediate steps should have been taken to transfer cargo from the Sea Empress to other vessels that more powerful tugs should have been on the spot at the beginning so that the ship could have been secured after the initial grounding, rather than subjected to the powerful tides which took it back onto the rocks and made the successful refloating operation such a tall order.
IT is easy to criticise a particular action or lack of action after the event but only those on the scene can make the necessary carefully balanced judgments in the light of what seems best at the time. Perhaps, if stronger tugs had been available to pull the ship clear at the start, this may have been done at the expense of damage to the hull and a release of more oil. To which the critics would have accused the salvors of overreacting.
But the official and obligatory inquiry will certainly want to know why the vessel, having first been pulled, free, was not immediately towed well offshore.
It will also want to know why, at an earlier stage with a pilot aboard, the Sea Empress was out of the normal shipping channel and what action was taken at that time. The tanker was a relatively new ship, built in 1993, and so far there has been no sign of mechanical failure. Human error will clearly be raised.
These matters are for later. The immediate issue is too important to be turned into a row between political parties. In my view, the salvors pursued the only course they could important thing last night was to ensure that they had access to the necessary facilities and expertise to avoid further serious spillages.
As for the environment, the damage is done. Even with the most effective clean up operation and favourable weather conditions carrying the slick away from shore, the coastline of south west Wales will be visibly affected for many months to come.
In the longer term, we have to face up to the problem of conflicting interests located in the same area. On one hand, we want to be able to enjoy a pristine marine environment, with its wildlife, opportunities for recreation and its possibilities for fishing. On the other, there is society's need for oil, and the fact is that any laden tanker approaching a refinery or leaving an oil terminal must be a potential hazard. No matter how advanced our technology, human error can never be wholly eliminated.
