Mary Faulkner (appellant) v The Minister for Industry and Commerce (respondent).

Employment - Equality - Male employee promoted ahead of two female employees - Whether discrimination based on sex - Ratio of male female promotions required objective explanation - Equality officer found discrimination - Labour Court found no discrimination - Whether reasons given in Labour Court were adequate - Whether material available on which Labour Court could reach its decision - Whether appeal under Act or judicial review was correct procedure.

The Supreme Court (the Chief Justice Mr Justice Hamilton, Mr Justice O'Flaherty and Mr Justice Barrington); judgment delivered 10 December 1996.

WHERE the Labour Court had overturned a decision of an equality officer that the failure to promote a female employee in favour of a male employee was discrimination based on sex, there was adequate material before the Labour Court on which it could reach its conclusion. The failure of the Labour Court to spell out in detail the basis of its decision did not invalidate the decision.

The Supreme Court so held in dismissing an appeal on a point of law from the decision of the Labour Court.

Gerard Hogan BL for the appellant; Aindrias O Caoimh SC and Iseult O'Malley BL for the respondent.

MR JUSTICE O'FLAHERTY said that the appellant was appointed an executive officer in the Department of Industry and Commerce in April 1979 and in 1981 she became eligible for promotion to the post of higher executive officer. In 1989 a vacancy existed for that post but a male executive officer was selected instead of the other two short listed candidates, the appellant and a Ms Kearns. The matter was investigated by an equality officer appointed by the Labour Court who concluded that Ms Kearns would have been promoted but for discrimination on the grounds of sex. However, the equality officer recommended that Ms Kearns and the appellant be awarded £600 by way of payment for distress, damage to confidence and injury to feeling as a result of that discrimination.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the Department's position was that there was a short list of three officers drawn up and the merits and demerits of each were discussed. One principal officer reported on the claimant, which report was based on a report of her former principal officer who had stated that the improvement in her work was continuing and that she was suitable for promotion but she was not exceptional. Her then principal officer indicated at the promotion conference that her then colleague, Ms Kearns, was the stronger of the two and the discussion then centred around Ms Kearns and the male executive officer, following which he was promoted. Having analysed the ratio of promotions male female, the equality officer considered it was necessary for the Department to give an objective explanation for this. The only reason put forward as to why the appellant did not receive a strong recommendation at the promotion conference was that she had a problem with her ability to express herself in documents which had been resolved but the conference needed to be assured that this improvement would be sustained. The equality officer asked herself whether this was a genuine objective reason and concluded that it was not.

The Minister then appealed to the Labour Court which allowed the appeal. The Labour Court stated that the history of the promotions in the Department placed an onus on it to prove that the claimant was not discriminated against in this case. The Labour Court concluded that the Department had reasonable grounds other than sex or marital status for not promoting her.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that it had been argued in the High Court that the Labour Court had erred in law on two grounds (1) that it did not specify the basis on which the respondent had reasonable grounds other than sex for not promoting her and (2) that no administrative body, such as the Labour Court, having examined all the relevant evidence and having directed itself properly as to the facts and the law could reasonably have come to the aforesaid conclusion.

As to the second ground Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the High Court had ruled on the basis of the decision in O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanala [1992] ILRM 237 and no appeal lay from the finding in that respect.

As regards the first ground, Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the High Court thought it unfortunate that the Labour Court did not expand further on the reasons for its decision and found that its "pithy conclusion" contrasted with the detailed analysis in the report of the equality officer. Nonetheless the High Court held that the recitals to the decision of the Labour Court and the report of the equality officer could only mean that the Labour Court was prepared to operate on the claimant's assessment records where the equality officer was not.

While this could have been made clearer, the High Court held that the failure of the Labour Court to spell it out with the detail recommended by the Chief Justice in North Western Health Board v Martyn [1987] IR 568 did not invalidate the order made by the Labour Court or give any ground for appeal.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that it was common case that the Labour Court was obliged to give reasons for its decision in broad and general terms and the matter for resolution was whether the reasons given were adequate. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Labour Court could not be said to have given adequate reasons since the assessment records on which they relied were contradictory from report to report. It was accepted on behalf of the appellant that it would have been a harder case to meet if the Labour Court had taken certain extracts from the records and accepted them as decisive.

It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that the question for resolution was whether there was material on which the Labour Court could reach the conclusion that it did and it was argued that there was such material in the assessment records.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the equality officer in finding that there was discrimination was in effect finding that the reasons given by the Department were simply to mask the real reason for their refusal to make the recommendation that she felt should have been made. Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the Labour Court was entitled to reach the conclusion that this construction of the actions of the Department should be rejected.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty also noted the observations of Mr Justice Barrington during the hearing of the case that courts and tribunals in other jurisdictions when adjudicating on an employer/ employee dispute will not make superfluous findings against an employee out of proper regard for the person's feelings. Provided the gist of the reasons for the decision of the tribunal in question was apparent, Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the decision should not be faulted just because it employed a benevolent economy of expression.

In considering the right procedure to be adopted in such cases as this, Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that the Act gave a right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law. It was unlikely that the failure to give adequate reasons was a point of law, but, since the matter had got this far, Mr Justice O'Flaherty was of opinion that it was best that the court should dispose of it and in any event the speediest way of disposing of litigation was often the best.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that there was only one point here, whether the appellant was discriminated against on the grounds of sex. The equality officer held that she was and the Labour Court reached the opposite conclusion and there was material on which it could do so. It did not expound on [its reasons, but, Mr Justice O'Flaherty said that without any doubt the reasons were available in the materials which it said it had considered.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty reiterated that when reasons are required from administrative tribunals they should only be required to give the broad gist of the basis of their decisions. It was of no service to the public in general, or to particular individuals, if the courts subjected every decision of every administrative tribunal to minute analysis. The appeal was dismissed.

Mr Justice O'Flaherty said the court had been informed at the outset that, in the interim, the appellant had in fact got the promotion that she desired but the appeal proceeded on the issue of a question of principle.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR JUSTICE BARRINGTON agreed with the judgment of Mr Justice O'Flaherty.

Solicitors: Terence Cosgrave & Co (Dublin) for the appellant; Chief State Solicitor for the respondent.