War is simply the extension of politics, according to Carl Von Clausewitz. The Vietnam war was brought into America's living room by the media. For the first time ever, unedited and virtually real-time war footage was available to a mass audience. This led to a growing sense of disquiet among Americans about its war aims and tactics in South Vietnam.
In parallel with this development was an ever-expanding mission creep in south east Asia. What began as a minor police action ended as a major military intervention costing the lives of approximately 66,000 US troops and countless Vietnamese soldiers and civilians alike.
The US military learned a very valuable lesson - a poorly-defined military campaign will lack public support and will lack the political will necessary to prosecute it.
Bearing this in mind, subsequent US military operations were carefully stage managed. US interventions in Panama and Grenada helped to cure the American public of its crisis of confidence in the military post-Vietnam.
This relationship reached its zenith during the Gulf War. The war aims, on the surface at least, were simple - get Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Republican Guard out of Kuwait.
From a military point of view, this was a conflict that lent itself to control of the media. The battle lines were fixed and static.
Unlike Vietnam, there was little chance of a camera crew stepping off a helicopter to encounter unanticipated live fighting. Instead, the media were assigned to two Joint Bureaux of Information or JIB's at Dhahran and Riyadh. Journalists and camera crews were assigned to Military Information Officers and organised into response teams to be deployed to carefully selected battle zones.
Journalists were assigned to operational areas manned by troops of their own nationality. This encouraged latent feelings of national pride and patriotism among even the most seasoned and cynical journalists. It was not uncommon to see high-profile British and American war correspondents, both male and female, wearing the uniform of coalition troops to whom they were assigned during peak-time news broadcasts.
From a media relations perspective, this was a major coup for the military. One commentator at the time noted that "the new world political order and the new world communications order had merged into one".
During the Serb air campaign the military employed a new level of sophistication in dealing with the media. A number of key factors determined this approach. The war aims were not as clear as they had been in previous conflicts. Neither was the battlefield fixed or static. There was much public discussion and criticism of the concept of an air operation without ground action. Against this background, Jamie Shea became the public face of allied action over Serbia.
The tactic of employing a civilian front man proved useful for the Allies, helping to shore up support for a problematic air campaign.
In press conferences, press briefings and press releases, NATO employed careful use of language. While Milosevic and the Serbs would claim that civilian casualties had taken place, Jamie Shea would confirm or deny such reports.
The language that the allies used filtered through to the media and became the exnominated voice of authority. This reinforced NATO's version of events as official and accurate.
In tandem with this approach was the destruction of the Serb television station in Belgrade in the early stages of the campaign. In the absence of a credible alternative version of events, the military achieved a virtually uncontested primary definition of the war as it unfolded.
Colin Powell, a veteran of Vietnam and the Gulf War, will have been conscious of the important role public perception and the media would play in the current crisis.
In order to sustain public support for what would inevitably become a difficult and unpopular military campaign, the US and British administrations would have to depend on a positive rapport with the media. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the Bush and Blair administrations seemed to assume the terrorist outrage would result in a compliant and uncritical media. The language of state since the attacks and the actions of the Americans and British presuppose universal support for their actions in Central Asia.
Despite this presumption, however, it would appear the US and British have seriously mishandled the media war. They appear to have forgotten the valuable lessons learned from previous conflicts. As was the case with Vietnam, they have failed to state their war aims in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
They have used conventional tactics against an unconventional enemy and now find themselves robbed of the military initiative as winter approaches in Afghanistan.
As civilian casualties in Afghanistan mount and pressure is brought to bear on the coalition against terror, the US and British appear to be militarily and politically veering "off message".
Even Tony Blair, normally a consummate media performer, appears under pressure. New Labour announced last week that he would give an emotional speech in Wales to rally support for the war.
The emotional speech failed to reassure a sceptical British media.
He was subsequently snubbed in Damascus in what was no doubt an emotional round of talks to garner support among Arabs for the war.
It may be the case that the media have grown tired of smug military-speak and high tech images of not-so smart weapons.
It may also be the case that the man and woman in the street are more media literate and sophisticated than the politicians and generals would give them credit for. It is certain, however, that the US and Britain are not winning the media war at present. This is exacerbated for the British and Americans by the continuing operation of Al Jazeera - a competing discourse and powerful propaganda tool for the Taliban.
This is an unconventional war that required a creative response from the US administration. This response was not forthcoming.
Instead, the US and Britain have employed an old and familiar tactic: using gunboat diplomacy to force their agenda in Afghanistan.
This approach may simply play into the hands of the terrorist. From a media and propaganda point of view, the US and British intervention has inflamed Islamic fundamentalism world-wide.
In an era of global terrorism, this may be a war that enters the living rooms and workplaces of America. Not merely as an image, but as a physical reality.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army Captain. He lectures in the political economy of communications in the Institute of Technology, Tallaght, Co Dublin