When the posse is after an outlaw "Wanted: dead or alive" it does not encourage expectations of a live capture, writes Martin Mansergh.
It was a great coup for the US unit commanded by Col James Hickey to have "got" Saddam Hussein in so unexpectedly a peaceful fashion, something no one would have credited either belligerent president.
It is understandable that the prisoner should have been shown on television to kill any burgeoning conspiracy theories. Showing him undergoing an oral examination was unnecessary.
President Bush calling for the death penalty somewhat spoiled the effect of the capture, though few in his domestic constituency would have considered that statement as anything but natural.
The US and the EU are fundamentally divided on the legitimacy of the death penalty.
The trial and execution of a foreign political dictator who retains many loyal followers is a separate issue and fraught with pitfalls.
It would be all too easy in a culture that few Westerners properly understand to convert execution, even with all crimes laid bare, including genocide, into the martyrdom and apotheosis of Saddam Hussein.
The background of shared values that was a factor in the 1946 Nuremberg trials, which were also victors' justice, does not exist to the same degree in this instance.
It will now be harder to persuade people of the genuine independence of any specially-established tribunal in Iraq that hands down that sentence.
Every country that wishes to live at peace with others relies on the international rule of law.
Every time a powerful country appears to flout or override the rule of law, it gives encouragement and sense of justification to terrorists.
In a civilised world, not disregarding a legitimate right to self-defence, it is not the force of one superpower but the collective force of the international community that counts or ought to count.
It is hard for the US, with its immense military power and following the outrageous attack on the Twin Towers, not to use that power as it sees fit, without the restraints imposed by others not always willing to shoulder responsibility or who have other agendas.
During our EU presidency, and as part of US-EU reconciliation and of providing a way out of the Iraq morass, we should strive to restore a sense of internationalism to centre stage.
The Taoiseach was delighted that, with Ireland left off the list of allied countries eligible to provide lead contractors for reconstructing Iraq, the US unwittingly clarified, for the benefit of doubters at home, that Ireland had not been part of that coalition.
In true neutral fashion, we neither belong to the group of EU countries that signed with Tony Blair a letter supporting the war, nor did we join the Franco-German "old Europe" in trying to obstruct it.
Our decided preference for the UN route was made clear on every occasion. Our opposition to a war fought without a fresh covering UN mandate cannot be doubted.
Our neutrality is, and always has been, by choice a policy, not a juridical status (such as was the case for Austria for more than 30 years after the 1955 State Treaty).
Joining a military alliance now requires post-Nice a vote of the people in a referendum. Within broad bounds, the implementation of that policy of neutrality is a matter for government judgement and decision.
In the second World War, though neutral, we discreetly provided certain valuable facilities to Britain and the Allies.
While use of Shannon by US aircraft has certainly stretched the policy to the limit, no other EU country, whether neutral or NATO member opposed to the war, took a decision to deny all facilities to the Americans that I am aware of.
Nor was it ever the view of a majority of Irish people that we should do so in relation to Shannon.
Of course, we have to be prepared in certain circumstances to sacrifice material interests for an important point of principle.
But being neutral on the side of Saddam Hussein's Iraq against George Bush's America was not a principle or worth a sacrifice.
Leaving aside any arguable effects on investment, the US administration has put an enormous amount of effort without obvious self-interest into the North's peace process.
It would have made their reaction to what would have been perceived as a kick in the teeth all the stronger.
The capture of a tyrant with a Stalinist disregard for human life is profoundly welcome. Outside terrorism which is active in Iraq will presumably find less internal support, allowing the transition to proceed.
There is no guarantee how long it would have taken for the regime to have been brought down by its own people, the solution advocated by critics. One can only feel sorry for any people for one or more generations unable to change an oppressive and unpopular government; countries which these days include Castro's Cuba, Mugabe's Zimbabwe, the military government of Burma and North Korea.
High casualties in the aftermath of the Iraq war demonstrate the drawbacks of unilateral military action, and hopefully the experience of acting without the full legitimacy of UN support will not be repeated. This will not be solely up to the US.
The fear of weapons of mass destruction, which it would have been suicidal for Iraq to have used at any stage after 1990, was a poorly-grounded pretext for war.
Saddam Hussein and his regime paid a high price for not taking the UN seriously and for giving UN inspectors in the 1990s the run-around. Even in the autumn of 2001, no convincing effort was made by Iraq to disarm international opinion.
If we want to see a new international order, it is best brought about by increased support for the UN on all sides, and for regional organisations, like the EU, when acting on its behalf.