US may be lucky in third joust with UN

US/Iraq: The US has already got as much help with Iraq as it is likely to receive, writes Conor O'Clery.

US/Iraq: The US has already got as much help with Iraq as it is likely to receive, writes Conor O'Clery.

Three times since the summer the United States tried to get UN Security Council approval for a draft resolution on Iraq that contained two essential demands. These were approval for a US-commanded international security force to control the country, and UN acceptance of American sovereignty in Iraq until a democratically-elected government was ready to take over in Baghdad.

The first two drafts were dead on arrival. They contained no deadline for giving the country back to the Iraqis, nor was there any commitment seriously to involve the UN in the transition process. France led a chorus of protest from China, Russia and Germany, calling for a much speedier transfer of power.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan virtually killed the second draft on arrival when he voiced public misgivings about leaving the occupation forces in charge of the political transition. This was something the UN should be involved in, he said, and leaving it like that could compromise UN personnel working in the country.

READ MORE

His scathing comments, made in the aftermath of the deadly car-bomb attack that killed his friend and UN representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, stiffened opposition on the council and Washington almost abandoned its efforts to get any resolution that left it in charge. But US Secretary of State Colin Powell submitted a third text after a lot of the now familiar cajoling and arm-twisting of Security Council members. There was no substantial change in the two main elements of the draft that was tabled for a vote last night, but a deadline of sorts was inserted, as well as symbolic recognition of Iraqi sovereignty. It set December 15th for the US-appointed transitional Governing Council in Iraq to work out a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding elections. To show good faith Mr Powell called for the drafting of a constitution within six months and it helped yesterday when the chairman of the Governing Council, Mr Ayad Allawi, said elections would "definitely" be held next year.

The new text recognised however that the Coalition Authority, headed by Mr Paul Bremer, remained in political control until an "internationally recognised, representative government" was in place, but it also said the interim Governing Council "embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period", an important symbolic step. The goal of Washington has been to give other countries diplomatic cover for helping the US-led coalition with the military and financial cost of restoring an Iraqi government.

Passage of the resolution would also give the US higher moral ground in defending its Iraq operation, and international cover for the Bush administration's effort to extract a massive $87 billion in appropriations from the US Congress. But while important politically to the Bush administration, the resolution is unlikely to make much immediate difference in reality. Its passage will strengthen the hand of the US at the donors' conference on Iraq due to be held in Madrid next Thursday but the contributions will be a tiny percentage of the money needed.

"We've wanted for a long time to get it adopted prior to the donors' conference," said US Ambassador John Negroponte. "We've also signalled we were desirous of putting it to a vote before the President and the Secretary of State left for the Bangkok APEC leaders' meeting."

The US has also already got almost as many foreign military contributions and commitments as it is likely to get. In the run up to the expected vote yesterday Mr Powell reportedly exerted heavy bilateral pressure on several council member governments, in a rerun of the pre-war days when the US was looking for support for invading Iraq.

Mexico, which has consistently taken the side of France, was the subject of considerable attention. At stake was the difference between a diplomatic triumph, where the US got a solid majority, and a hollow victory where its allies continued to register disapproval through abstention for US policy in the region.