The view that the Rev Ian Paisley, now the North's First Minister, was "associated with paramilitaries" and that he might be arrested for conspiracy, was discussed by senior Stormont officials in 1977, confidential files reveal.
The remarks emerge in the minutes of a meeting between the permanent undersecretary of the Northern Ireland Office, Brian Cubbon, and permanent secretaries at Stormont during the United Ulster Action Council strike of May 1977.
At a meeting on May 10th, 1977, Cubbon stressed the importance of learning the lessons of the strike, especially in regard to the serious issue of intimidation. "The blocking of roads was illegal and demanded strong and immediate action if the practice was not to snowball."
The permanent undersecretary referred to the very firm action that had been taken by the police at roadblocks and gave details of a major operation to be mounted by the RUC in Ballymena, with army support.
In further discussion, it was questioned whether outsiders who had sought to influence workers at Ballylumford power station who had declared against strike action, ought not be apprehended, since their action was tantamount to coercion aimed at bringing industry to a halt.
If anything, it was a case of workers being pressurised for political ends. Cubbon observed that this was a difficult legal area, since the tactics of those involved might be seen as "peaceful persuasion".
The minutes continue: "It was pointed out, however, that the person responsible [Paisley] was associated with and had the support of the Protestant paramilitaries and it was queried whether he ought not to be held for conspiracy."
The permanent undersecretary explained that this was a prosecution rather than a legal problem, but that penalties for attempted coercion of industrial workers in firms by outsiders would have to be considered carefully.
Officials stressed the need to identify the nature of the economic activity of paramilitaries and to proceed against it. However, "a very tough line against the Protestant strikers should be resisted, otherwise the question was bound to be asked why such action had not been taken earlier against the IRA. If there had to be tough action, then there had to be still tougher action against the IRA following the strike."
Public opinion, officials noted, favoured the retention of the extra army units (drafted in during the loyalist strike) to deal with the IRA. "The strikers of Larne harbour, for instance, wish to see the return of troops to the green areas."
The hope was expressed that when the strike ended, there would be no question of a formula being devised "to allow Mr Paisley off the hook".
It was suggested that the DUP leader had a marked facility for finding his own way out of situations, but even if he were dislodged from his pinnacle, his followers would not be shaken and would continue to pursue his objectives.
For his part, Cubbon thought that Paisley was less at home on security than on constitutional issues and that his judgment tended to be faulty on the former. It was noted that a motion had been tabled at Westminster seeking Paisley's removal as an MP.