IRAN: Iran's interest in nuclear power goes back to the US and the 1950s, writes Michael Jansen
Tehran's decision to accept the additional protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and suspend uranium enrichment should, at least temporarily, satisfy the international community that Iran is not secretly attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons.
This does not mean, however, that Iran will halt research into nuclear technology or stop developing domestic applications allowed under the treaty. Iran has already laid down the foundations of a nuclear programme and has said it will not give it up.
Iran's interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was sparked by the Atoms for Peace Programme, launched in the 1950s by the Eisenhower administration. Iran received its first research reactor from the US under this scheme.
But Tehran did not take nuclear power seriously until 1974, when the Shah, the country's ruler prior to the Islamic revolution of 1979, decided to build 20 reactors to meet the rising electricity needs of the country's rapidly growing population. Uranium enriched to a low level is used for such plants, while highly enriched material is needed for bombs.
Work on the first light water reactor at Bushayhr was begun by a West German company under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But this project was dropped after the revolution and the country's nuclear installations were destroyed by the Iraqi air force during the 1980-88 war.
In 1995, the clerical regime revived the programme with the aim of building 10 nuclear power plants over 20 years. So far, however, Tehran has moved forward only with the Bushayhr facility, which is nearing completion. Instead of investing in more power plants, Iran has developed the range of installations needed for a fully-fledged nuclear programme.
They include:
Expanding the nuclear centre at the University of Isfahan, built by France before the Shah's overthrow to train personnel for the Bushayhr reactor. The centre was initially supplied by France with a small light water reactor and fuel reprocessing installation. The Chinese later provided a heavy water research reactor. Both reactors could, in theory, be used to produce small amounts of weapons-grade material but nowhere near enough for a bomb.
Mining domestic sources of uranium.
Building, reportedly, two uranium processing plants, one at Ardakan to convert ore into yellowcake, the first stage of the purification process, the other at Isfahan for the production of hexafloride gas used for enriching uranium by the centrifuge process. The second seems to be a facility suitable for research.
Carrying out preliminary work on a centrifuge enrichment plant at Nantaz, 150 km south of Tehran. The facility has 156 centrifuges so far.
Constructing a plant at Arak for producing heavy water and manufacturing radioactive material for medical applications. Both could be converted to highly enriched uranium.
Finally, the Bushayhr 1,000 megawatt facility is set to come on line early next year and Russia has agreed to construct another three plants at the same site. Russia will provide both nuclear fuel and take back spent fuel for reprocessing.
Iran's rival conservative and reformist rulers both insist that the country's nuclear programme is for energy production only. Iranian and international experts argue that the facilities so far constructed are experimental and too small for the production of significant amounts of weapons grade material.
Iran would have to acquire thousands of tons of uranium for processing into yellowcake before beginning the enrichment process. Tehran would also have to construct an enrichment plant which would be the size of a small city and consume vast amounts of energy as well as acquire 2,500 centrifuges for a weapons programme. This being the case, experts say, it would be very difficult for Tehran to develop a clandestine programme.
US and Israeli analysts claim Iran could build a nuclear bomb within two years were it not for monitoring by the IAEA. On the other hand, Iran could agree to monitoring for the present and withdraw from the NPT later, as North Korea has done.
Hard-liners in both Washington and Tel Aviv have threatened military action against Iran's nuclear sites. Some sources believe, however, that their aim is not to stop Iran from making bombs but to prevent Iran from having any nuclear programme.