The Clinton administration faces growing pressure to end the protracted, costly crisis with Iraq the simple way, by getting rid of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, the man who started it all.
Congressional leaders this week have called for it. Columnists of both left and right are clamouring to take him out. Washington power-brokers, including a former CIA director and the Defence Secretary, have written to the White House advocating a new strategy to remove Mr Saddam.
And opinion polls show the American public, by an almost 4-1 margin, favours a US military strike designed to eliminate Mr Saddam, not just force his compliance with an international disarmament regime.
But the most efficient strategy may be the hardest, and, barring a military miracle, Mr Saddam is likely to still be in power, and a threat, when this confrontation is over.
The most basic obstacle to removing him is mandate. The US does not have it.
"That is not what the UN has authorised us to do. That is not what our immediate interest is about," President Clinton acknowledged on Thursday.
Weary of a problem that has already cost billions of dollars and repeatedly diverted global attention from pressing problems of the post-Cold War world, Washington would clearly like to have the option.
Since Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US, its allies and the Iraqi opposition have tried or considered five disparate strategies to rid the region of its most lethal threat.
But each is fraught with difficulties: Assassination: this most obvious tactic is illegal. In 1976 President Ford issued Executive Order No 12333, which said: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." The simple 22-word edict was issued after a CIA report revealed that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were involved in plots or coups against eight foreign leaders. Congressional officials on Thursday suggested changing the law. But removing Mr Saddam has not proved any easier for internal opponents, who are not bound by such restrictions, despite dozens of attempts. The Iraqi leader takes extreme security measures.
Military assault: this option is the most costly, in human, financial and political terms. US analysts over the years have estimated that a military operation to change the Iraqi regime would require hundreds of thousands of ground troops as well a display of air power so vast it would dwarf Operation Desert Storm. It would mean sweeping into Baghdad and possibly would prompt Mr Saddam to use chemical and biological weapons. Large numbers of casualties would be likely. Unlike the 1991 Gulf war, the US would probably have to go it alone this time. Most former coalition partners are already reluctant about a limited US air strike.
Covert operations: this is the most possible option but also the most susceptible to Iraqi penetration and disruption. The largest CIA operation since the Afghan war was in Iraq. For six years tens of millions of dollars were poured annually into the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of Kurds and Sunni and Shia Muslims based in northern Kurdistan; their mission was to destabilise and potentially replace the regime. The CIA also ran one of its biggest stations in northern Iraq. But both the INC and CIA were forced out in a lighting military strike by Mr Saddam's troops in 1996, on the pretext of stopping clashes between Kurdish rivals. A separate CIA-backed plot to overthrow Hussein from within the ranks of his elite Republican Guard was uncovered in 1996.
Internal uprising: this would be the most preferable. Days after the Gulf war's end, northern Kurds and southern Shias simultaneously started uprisings. But the US-led coalition let Iraq retaliate with its air power, the key in Baghdad's swift, deadly response. The coalition then feared Iraq might fragment into three ethnic-based parts, with a divisive effect across the region. No-fly zones have since been imposed on northern and southern Iraq.
War crimes prosecution: this is the long shot. In Desert Shield the Pentagon began accumulating material, from individual human rights abuses to violations of international accords, for possible war crimes prosecution. The documents, interviews and other evidence were vast. But the Bush administration shelved the case as unrealistic. Although it might provide a legal basis to seize Mr Saddam the case also might be more difficult to prosecute almost eight years later.
Congressional officials acknowledged on Thursday the obstacles to ousting Mr Saddam. Any attempt to remove him "would not be a Noriega operation, where you'd just go in and get him," said Senator John McCain, of Arizona, referring to the US capture of former Panamanian strongman, Manuel Noriega.